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Abstract

Japan is, as former Prime Minister Asō Tarō once put it, commonly described as being
“one race, one civilization, one language and one culture.”1 This statement reflects a popular
conception of Japan as a homogenous nation. However, the purpose of this paper, building on
earlier research, is to assess what exactly Japanese identity is, how it is constructed/maintained,
and who is and is not considered “Japanese.” The impetus of this inquiry comes from my
research of the hisabetsu burakumin, a Japanese social outcaste group, who have undergone
significant changes throughout their long history as a socially-constructed “minority.” This
particular study of Japanese identity and its “Other” should help illuminate how ideology,
discourse, and discrimination fuse with social institutions to create a means of self-identification
and Other-identification. Using the particular cases of the Zainichi Koreans and the hisabetsu
burakumin, I intend to analyze how different identities are incorporated into the larger social
apparatus of Japanese society, which recognizes only one notion of “Japanese.”

1

"Asō Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race' | The Japan Times." Japan Times RSS. Accessed October 22, 2017.
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The Conceptual Framework for Deconstructing Ideology
Identity is an integral part of human life, but it is an incredibly nuanced construct. The
discourse concerning how individuals, communities, and nations construct identities involves a
wide variety of facets including race/ethnicity, politics, philosophy, language, and culture. Given
the breadth of the topic, I have narrowed in on the discourse concerning Japanese identity. What
does it mean to be Japanese? How is the mainstream definition of Japanese identity
produced/perpetuated by discourse and culture? In what way does this hegemonic identity relate
to the identities of marginalized groups in Japan? Though there is an ever-present danger of
ascribing either a monolithic or multicultural categorization or theory to Japanese society, I am
not aiming to determine a definite explanation of Japanese identity or culture. Using the
discourse of Nihonjinron and contemporary political and social theories, I will outline features of
a mainstream Japanese identity to which I will relate the identities of various marginalized
groups. To address these minority groups’ identities, the historical, cultural, racial/ethnic, and
political dimensions of each group will be explored. I aim to demonstrate how these different
identities are subsumed within the larger social apparatus of Japanese society, which recognizes
only one notion of “Japanese,” but whose existence challenges Japanese cultural hegemony.
To investigate the matter of identity, we can begin by analyzing the related, but distinct,
notion of Eric Hobsbawn’s “invented tradition.” The scholar Stephen Vlastos elaborates on
Hobsbawn’s idea by detailing how traditions, like identities, are social constructs, meaning that
their existence is dependent upon the societies and people that reify them through actualization.2
However, one should not confuse the term “invented” with something that is entirely fictitious,

2

Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity:
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2.
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without consequence, or without significance. Vlastos argues that scholars often frame the
complexity of the term “tradition” itself within the timeframes to which they are relevant,
created, and are used, as things opposite of modernity.3 Additionally, tradition is conceptualized
as marking “the continuous cultural transmission” of the past to the present, by both individuals
and structures.4 Yet, Hobsbawm outlines the term: “‘invented tradition’ is used in a broad, but
not imprecise sense. It includes both ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed and formally
instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner within a brief and dateable
period…” which opposes the common conceptualizations of tradition by scholars.5 Instead of
conceiving tradition as fixed social rituals and beliefs, Hobsbawm argues that traditions should
be understand as social constructs intentionally invented by nations and peoples to create a sense
of historical continuity and norms.
Another concept relevant to the discussion of identity as a product of cultural and social
discourse is Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities.” For Anderson, the
“imagined political community” is imagined as “both inherently limited and sovereign.”6 A
community marks a particular spatial entity and incorporates a sense of communion that
connects all of its members.7 Anything larger than a “primordial village” will fit the definition of
“imagined community,” for it is the socio-political imagining of nation or space that is both finite
and free.8 Lastly, it is a “community” because the nation is “always conceived as a deep,

3

Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity:
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2.
4
Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” 2.
5
Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
1.
6
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 2006), 5-6.
7
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
8
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 2006), 7.
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horizontal comradeship,” a conceptualization that people are willing to die for.9 Anderson’s
representation of social groups will map on well to the Nihonjinron discussion concerning
national identity and culture. It is important to understand how the individual works that
constitute the Nihonjinron discourse are indicative of a larger enterprise of imaging a national
Japanese political entity.
The discourse of Nihonjinron requires particular analysis, for much of the scholarship
concerning Japanese identity relates in some way to the body of work, both Japanese and
foreign, commonly designated under the umbrella-term of “Nihonjinron.”10 Though national
studies is not something unique to Japan or the Japanese, the Nihonjinron discourse is marked by
scholars as a particular subset of nationalistic scholarship.11 The history of the discourse is by no
means inconsequential to the aim of this paper, for the discourse of Nihonjinron is not limited to
academic circles or institutions but is instead a commonly engaged activity in mainstream
Japanese society.12 However, there is a noteworthy concern to raise when discussing the
Nihonjinron discourse as it is in many ways a prime example of Hobsbawn’s concept of
“invented tradition.”
In simply separating Nihonjinron from other national studies, one emphasizes a particular
discourse peculiar only to Japan. Whether scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese, attempt to affirm
or deny the various claims of the Nihonjinron discourse, their partaking in the conversation
perpetuates its ideas as an existing discursive body.13 This reification of Nihonjinron by even its

9

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2.
11
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), i-ii.
12
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 2-3.
13
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), i-ii.
10
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detractors creates an interesting dilemma when addressing the notion of Japanese identity. If we
are to use a representation of Japanese identity derived from the Nihonjinron discourse, then are
we affirming all or parts of this particularly troublesome body of work? However, we cannot
begin to develop an idea of Japanese identity completely separate from the discourse of
Nihonjinron given the prevalence and influence the discourse has had in the formation of
perceptions of Japanese societal norms and ideology.
More complications arise when we consider that any essentialist perspective of Japanese
identity requires a conscious disregard of actual human variance.14 Using representations or
attempting to articulate a representation of an entire people requires critical consideration, lest I
present an egregiously inaccurate portrayal or engage in some sort of paternalistic, Orientalist, or
racist scholarship. Therefore, even though I will employ models of identity for various groups
living in Japan, I do not assert that these models constitute a kind of absolute “reality” or “truth.”
Edward Said, a postcolonial studies scholar and renowned public intellectual, presents an
argument for why scholars ought to be careful when “representing others” in his book
Orientalism:
…the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or
whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first
in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the
presenter. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be
prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined,
embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the “truth,” that is itself a
representation.15
The purpose of representations in this paper is to analyze the cultural construction of identity by
both mainstream Japanese society and various marginalized groups. Tradition, or culture, and

14
15

Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 222.
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 272-273.
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identity are tied in that even if they are invented or representations, they form a very tangible and
very real basis for social-political structures and ideology.
An example par excellence of this is former Japanese Prime Minister, Asō Tarō’s (name
in Japanese order of [surname, given name]) image of Japan as “one race, one civilization, one
language and one culture,” a representation that has been left mainly unchallenged in both
Japanese and Western popular discourse.16 Furthermore, the Western conception of Japan as a
xenophobic and homogenous nation, perpetuates a narrative of Japan that downplays,
overgeneralizes, or completely ignores internal differences. Yet, Japan is, I argue with John Lie,
a nation constituted of various peoples, civilizations, languages, and cultures. The Ainu of
Hokkaido, the Ryūkyūan of Okinawa, the Zainichi Koreans, and the hisabetsu burakumin,
among others, have a stake in Japan’s national identity.
To elaborate on this particular representation, a homogenous society is a society that is
uniform in structure and lacking or devoid of difference.17 The Japan described by former Prime
Minister Asō’s statement portrays a unified, monolithic nation, which perpetuates a cultural
hegemonic representation that subsumes differences. However, the issue is not that Japan claims
to be homogenous when it is not, but the claim that “Japaneseness” is something devoid of
difference and identified solely with mainstream society. To downplay group variance is to make
invisible what society finds undesirable and enforces silence on marginalized communities,
preventing them from expressing their differences in the foreground. This was the reality for the
Ainu, native Okinawans, and various other marginalized groups, who were subjected to
assimilatory polices and forced to adhere to a concept of “Japaneseness” that only alienated them

16
17

"Aso Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race' | The Japan Times." Japan Times RSS. Accessed July 22, 2016.
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “homogeneous.”
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further.18 Ethnic and cultural minorities had to deal with the reality that to be “non-Japanese”
meant to be peripheral, on the margins of society. The hisabetsu burakumin, the largest minority
group in Japan, in particular have been delegated to the fringes of Japanese society constantly
throughout Japanese history, though they are not “ethnically” different from other Japanese
people.19
Since this paper discusses the issues of discrimination, the reader should note that
discrimination itself is a complicated term and refers to a basic, universal human activity. To
“discriminate” means to differentiate things, ideas, people, places, and so forth on the basis of
available information.20 For example, one can discriminate between types of fruit or herbs based
on available or obtainable information that in turn is influenced by societal indoctrination,
personal biases, and accessibility. However, this definition is not challenged per se in this paper,
instead the ideology of social/racial discrimination and its connection to social structures,
attitudes, and behaviors that separate and classify people into different categories of social
positionality is. An ideology of discrimination is to be understood as an underlying and pervasive
cultural lens of stratification/differentiation that affects the way people of a particular society or
group behave and think without necessarily being aware of it. Ideology shapes how people
engage with and understand cultural symbols, meanings, and values concerning people, objects,
places, and ideas.21 Relevant to this conceptual framework is the term “Other,” which refers to a
type of group classification that designates a collective as being alien or different, normally in

18

Joshua H. Roth, "Blackwell Reference Online." CHAPTER 6. Political and Cultural Perspectives on "Insider"
Minorities: A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan, Accessed July 22, 2016, 74-76. Doi:
10.1111/b.9780631229551.2008.00006.x
19
Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 6-7.
20
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “discriminate.”
21
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “ideology.”
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relation to a dominate group. All nations and cultures have their “Others,” for they provide a
means for creating collective identity and association, which entail a host of interconnected
social consequences like social formation, accessibility of resources, and imposed societal values
and meanings.22
Before analyzing the Nihonjinron, I want to bring up the discussion concerning the
multicultural and multiethnic conceptions of Japan. The scholar Chris Burgess argues that
critiques of Japan’s “homogenous conception of Japan” and those who advocate a “multicultural
image of Japan” fail to see how cultural variance does not equate to multiculturalism.23 The
cultural hegemony of a particular notion of “Japaneseness” subsumes any cultural variance and
the lack of a cultural-equal to Japanese culture is indicative of this assured dominance.24 Burgess
argues that “…we can say that, on balance, Japan does not appear to be particularly multicultural
in terms of either discourse (1.2.1), policy (1.2.2), or people (1.2.3)...This begs the question of
whether those writing in the ‘multicultural Japan’ vein are not being descriptive but rather
prescriptive: not saying what Japan is like but what it should, ought to, or must be like.”25 To
engage the discourse of Japan in a prescriptive way betrays a scholar’s ability to represent Japan
as is, not as one wants to represent it as, which is an Orientalist activity. And I agree with
Burgess’ assessment of Japan, for despite the cultural variance in Japan, the hegemony of
mainstream Japanese culture is irreconcilable with the principles of multiculturalism.

22

Edward W Said, Orientalism, (Vintage Books A Division of Random House: New York, 1978), 1-4.
Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March
2007), http://apjjf.org/-Chris-Burgess/2389/article.html (accessed April 23, 2018).
24
Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March
2007), http://apjjf.org/-Chris-Burgess/2389/article.html (accessed April 23, 2018).
25
Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March
2007), http://apjjf.org/-Chris-Burgess/2389/article.html (accessed April 23, 2018).
23
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However, if Japan is neither a homogenous nor multicultural nation, then what
description is more fitting? While I do not think that any concept fully encapsulate every nuance
and facet of Japanese social structure and cultural dynamics, I agree with the sociologist John Lie
in arguing that Japan is a multiethnic state.26 For Lie, the monoethnic myth was created postWorld War II by nationalistic historiographers and nationalists imposing a view of Japan as
monoethnic from beginning to the present27. The political mobilization of ethnic minorities in
recent years is not indicative of a shift from monoethnic to multiethnic, but, Lie argues, is a reassertion of the “truth” that Japan has always been multiethnic.28 While cultural hegemony still
persists, minority social activism inherently challenges and deconstructs the perception of Japan
as homogenous or monolithic, for rooting “the monoethnic ideology in Japan in national
character or something deeper is not only contrary to historical fact; it does little to inform efforts
to challenge it.”29 And these challenges shape the social landscape of the nation from one of
homogeneity to heterogeneity, not because of multiculturalism but because of ethnic variance.
“Being Japanese:” Exploring Facets of Nihonjinron Discourse
Japanese identity, like all national identities, entails interwoven facets of environmental,
cultural, ethnic, and linguistic factors.30 For this purpose, Nihonjinron “日本人論,” despite its
controversial status, provides a comprehensive body of work that presents invaluable reflections
by various Japanese writers. Though there is a large amount of non-Japanese work concerning
Nihonjinron, I will attempt to limit or contextualize those sources differently from how I will try
26

John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.
John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 141.
28
John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 141.
29
John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 182-183.
30
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 16.
27
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to treat the Japanese sources. Rather than concern myself with which writers are more accurate
or less prejudicial, I think it is important to create a conception of Japanese identity that is largely
founded on Japanese perspectives as opposed to non-Japanese perspectives.
Outlining the identity of Japanese marginalized groups is equally difficult given the
complexity of their respective histories. Therefore, I will narrow down my focus in this paper to
examining the groups of the Zainichi Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin. How exactly are these
groups distinguished from mainstream Japanese society? How have their identities been changed
and fixed by the groups’ relation to mainstream Japanese identity? Does the existence of these
marginalized communities confirm or deny conceptualizing Japan as a homogenous state, a
multicultural state, or a multiethnic state? And furthermore, from analyzing the current state of
these marginalized groups, can we situate their future within Japanese society?
Identity is not a completely fixed construction, but an ever-changing, living
construction.31 The misconception of perceiving identity as something set in stone is the reason
why neither the monolithic nor multicultural representation of Japan are accurate, though I will
address this in further detail later. Societies, groups, and individuals construct their own
identities, but they also adhere to and reflect the prevalent social constructs of their particular
society and social groups.32 For this reason, Nihonjinron should not be perceived as some fixed
body of work, but an ever-expanding body of identity literature, a living discourse. And as the
French philosopher Michel Foucault noted, a discourse cannot be easily separated from the social
network of power that it is embedded into.33

31

Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1998), 6.
Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, 5-6.
33
Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power, and the Subject, (New York: New York
University Press, 1997), 21.
32
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Nihonjinron, as mentioned previously, is the categorization of a body of work comprising
various “theories” relating to Japanese cultural and racial uniqueness.34 The anthropologist
Harumi Befu argues that it is difficult to translate Nihonjinron into English because even though
the term “論” has various readings, the common de facto translation of “theory” implies an
image of a well-researched, scholarly work.35 For the purposes of this paper, the phrase
“discourse” will be used as it provides a more comprehensive connotation and is less tied to
scholarly implications. Befu notes that Nihonjinron writing has become something of a
“pastime” in Japan and something to which many writers, academic and otherwise, contribute
material.36 Instead of distinguishing between what is and what is not academic writing, Befu
argues that all work related to Nihonjinron comprise its body and engage a discourse often seen
as exclusive to scholars.37 Though Befu’s argument increases the sheer volume of texts one
might research, it also decreases the rigor or scholarly standards of said work, and his claim
allows for an analysis of Japanese identity as perceived and constructed by Japanese people, not
just scholars but non-scholars as well.
Peter Dale, another anthropologist, however, argues that analyzing the Nihonjinron
discourse requires the separation of non-scholarly work from scholarly work.38 Dale is concerned
with addressing the “fictional mentality” that is Nihonjinron, which he claims was constructed by
numerous thinkers and writers over an extended period of Japan’s history.39 Dale rejects the idea

34

Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2-3.
35
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 2.
36
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 3.
37
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.
38
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), i.
39
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, ii.
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of Nihonjinron being a “national ‘mentality’” or a way of thinking that is deeply connected to the
complex and interwoven meld of social and economic institutions and mechanisms.40 For Dale,
an analysis of Nihonjinron means undertaking the task of unraveling the various perplexing
aspects of Nihonjinron’s wide body of work.41 One must struggle, Dale argues, with the paradox
of a Japanese identity that asserts its own uniqueness while simultaneously denying the
uniqueness of the people who call themselves “Japanese.”42
Both of these scholars offer us a considerable amount of evidence to consider regarding
the exact nature of the Nihonjinron discourse. However, whether we reject it as pure fiction or
use it to assess a very real sense of Japanese identity depends on not only the works analyzed but
a stance on the purpose of national studies in general. To this end, the Japanese government’s
Ministry of Education in 1937 published the first issue of a document titled Kokutai no Hongi
“国体の本義” or “Cardinal Principles of the National Entity.” This particular work is known for
presenting a comprehensive view of Japanese identity that conformed every area of life into a
single, cohesive national identity.43 Given that this document was officially sanctioned by the
Japanese government it provides a framework for understanding how the modern, pre-World
War II Japanese state attempted to define the discourse of Nihonjinron and how Japanese
academics assisted in the venture. It is important to note that the whole discourse is greater than
any one document, but constructing and deconstructing Japanese identity requires first some
model of how the identity is represented on a national scale. Following this, I will use Dale and

40

Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, ii.
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, iii.
42
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, 22.
43
Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), (excerpt).
41
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Befu’s opposing views to further contextualize the nature of the discourse while also addressing
several of the concerns both scholars raise regarding the analysis of Nihonjinron.
Does a government-sanctioned document provide an objective or comprehensive
representation of Japanese identity? While it is important to recognize the potential biases
inherent in such a representation, it does comprise but one of the many interpretations of how
Japanese people have come to perceive themselves and understand their particular uniqueness in
human history. Rather than conceptualize this, however, as a completely fictional account with
no bearing on reality, like Dale, we should instead focus on how identity operates as a reified
representation of selfhood and culture. Though I will illustrate later how the dismissive approach
of Dale fails to recognize how identity operates within society and for individuals as well as how
the issue of Orientalism has structured the discourse of Nihonjinron from the beginning.
In analyzing excerpts from the Kokutai no Hongi, one can recognize the propagandistic
elements of the document that were intended to instill a sense of national cohesion as well as
provide an explanation of what it means to be “Japanese.”44 Though this relation is tied to the
nation-state and the emperor, who embodies the state, we see how Japanese identity is associated
with participation in the Japanese political-military complex and loyalty to the agenda and
programs of the Japanese Empire.45 What occurs within the document itself is an investigation
by its authors into how the “unrest” in the lives of the Japanese citizens is due to the nature of
Occidental ideologies and a lack of understanding of the “true meaning” of the national polity.46
Defining Japanese identity by characteristics such as patriotism and loyalty creates an image of a

44

Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), (excerpt).
Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, ().
46
Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, ().
45
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civic identity, something which connects one’s personhood to a particular polity.47 Opposing the
“Occident” likewise invokes the image of an “East” versus “West” depiction of human history,
in which two dissimilar, but ultimately linked, human spheres are in a state of constant
contention due to irreconcilable differences in their nature.48
Said, however, would counter that the use of the fictional “East” and “West” dichotomy
problematizes the actuality of Japan’s history and its relation to the world, for despite its
isolation, it was always connected to and engaged with said world.49 The Kokutai no Hongi is a
particularly useful document for analyzing how the Japanese state synthesized Japanese identity
and constructed a cohesive, national narrative. However, Befu argues that the Nihonjinron
discourse has been fairly accessible to a larger demographic than the Kokutai no Hongi might
imply, especially since the decrease in government restrictions after World War II and the
American occupation (1945-1952).50 For Befu, Japanese identity, as constructed by writers of
Nihonjinron, is a living, fluid process reflective of Japanese society and indicative of a reified
cultural and self-understanding.51 The difference between Dale’s view and the notion presented
by Hobsbawn is that the former does not recognize how social constructs represent or adhere to
people’s living experience and own self-understanding. Hobsbawn, however, grounds said
reification as a common human activity that forms the basis of creating what we call cultural or
national “tradition,” and by extension identity.52

47

Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, ().
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 54.
49
Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 54.
50
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
51
Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater,
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4.
52
Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity:
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 3.
48
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What we are presented with is an argument between two perceptions of social constructs:
1) that constructs have no actual bearing on reality, but work only within a theoretical or abstract
framework, thereby masking “truth”; 2) that constructs inform, reflect, and shape social and selfunderstanding and identity. While Dale holds that the discourse is a purely “fictional” body of
literature, in his own engagement of the subject, Dale reifies it as something which can be
addressed. Said notes that while we use representations of things, places, people, and so forth in
shaping our particular understanding of said subject, we run the risk of substituting the
representation for the actual, living subject.53 When addressing the topic of Nihonjinron from an
approach grounded in its own assurance of the subject’s paradoxical and incoherent logical
structure, we transform the subject of “Japanese identity” into an object, abstract from and
devoid of its actual human components.54 Analyzing the Nihonjinron discourse is not a matter of
unraveling or unmasking the “myth of Japanese uniqueness,” as Dale titled his text, in order to
uncover a “true” Japanese identity nor is it a means for psychoanalyzing why a whole people
believe in their own personal and national uniqueness.
The primary concern of this analysis is neither to conform to a notion that affirms
particular views within the discourse nor denies the bearing that Nihonjinron has on Japanese
identity and society. If we accept Said’s premise, we must also recognize that the shaping of
Japanese identity has occurred over the course of Japan’s historical process and is thus a
discourse related to Western imperialism and Orientalism, a discourse of disparate power
dynamics.55 While it might appear as if though Japanese people’s insistence on Japanese
uniqueness is easily refutable, we ought to recognize that Nihonjinron concerns only one
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particular discourse and that national studies is a common activity of peoples in all nations. The
discourse of Japanese identity does not comprise only negations of “not being Western,”
Japanese identity has been affected by its own “self-Orientalization,” or acceptance of Orientalist
thinking from non-Japanese and Japanese alike.56 Nihonjinron presents how writers negotiate
identity within a national community and in relation to intercultural/international interactions.
While Dale’s approach to Nihonjinron is dismissive of its ability to represent individual
and national identity, one should continue to consider Dale’s argument of how national identity
can subsume individual uniqueness.57 The Kokutai no Hongi frames Japanese identity within a
political context, but how is it constructed in relation to other factors? For the purposes of
illustrating how Japanese identity is constructed in relation to ecology, social structure, language,
culture and race/ethnicity, I will employ anthropologists Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s Re-Inventing
Japan: Time, Space, Nation and Befu’s Hegemony of Homogeneity. Both of these scholars
synthesize a variety of Nihonjinron texts to present how Japanese identity has been constructed
within the discourse.
The Japan of Nihonjinron: Ecology, Social Structure, Language, Culture, and Race
Part 1: Ecological Nihonjinron
How exactly is the environment connected to how groups and nations develop national
identity? Within the Nihonjinron discourse, Befu notes how the view of Japan as a “resourcepoor nation with frequent natural calamities” is a popular conception of Japan.58 Such an image
is derived from a discourse formed by a variety of Nihonjinron writers who argue that there is an
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“inextricable relationship between that geography and the cultural life of the Japanese.”59
Watsuji Tetsurō’s Fūdo is an example par excellence of this view and has been a rather
influential Nihonjinron text, often referenced by numerous other Nihonjinron writers.60 Instead
of simply accounting for how the weather affects Japanese culture, Watsuji focuses on how the
environment is the cause or basis for aspects of Japanese culture.61
In his text, Watsuji classifies Eurasia into three ecological types: monsoon, desert, and
pastoral.62 Of these three distinct types, Watsuji argues that Japan resides in the monsoon belt,
though its exact position also exposes it to the effects of the Artic air.63 This specific
combination of warm and cold, wet and dry, climate facilitated “Japan’s wet rice cultivation and
family structure to its national character, ethos, and esthetics.”64 Even Japan’s open architecture
is conceptualized as reflective of the Japanese people’s need to adapt to the climate of their
environment.65 Working upon this notion, Watsuji continues to formulate how even the absence
of privacy, denial of individual rights, and promotion of collective orientation, derived from the
architecture, are linked to the environment.66
Befu notes how Watsuji’s systemic approach to culture and environment was further
elaborated by other ecologically-oriented Nihonjinron writers such as Chikamatsu Yoshiyuki,
Kimata Tokou, and Tsukiyama Jisaburō. Another ecological writer, Kōyama Iwao, also argues
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that “Japanese sensitivity toward nature” is derived from the “physical conditions of Japan.”67 To
Kōyama, the Japanese “love of miniature and miniaturization,” manifested in such things as
haiku poetry, fifteen syllable poems, and bonsai gardening, planting pot-sized landscapes and
vegetation, is linked to the small size of Japan itself.68 Additionally, in rural Japan, the corporate
group structure is also linked to the wet-rice cultivation induced by the “closed nature” of the
village environment.69 Furthermore, Kōyama argues that the environment is responsible for
“Japanese optimism, this-worldly character, fusion of art and life, and even patriotism.”70
The link between Japan’s environment and Japanese psychology is a topic elaborated by
psychologist Miyagi Otoya. Miyagi notes that the “harsh, destructive environment” facilitated
the formation of a particular mentality and certain personality types among Japanese people.71 In
contrast to the West’s conquest of nature, Miyagi argues that the Japanese merely tried to adapt
to their environment, which he sees as manifestations of sadism and masochism respectively.72
This direct “environment-to-personality argument” was later changed by Miyagi to include a
component detailing how personality is “mediated through living conditions (‘food, shelter, and
clothing’).”73 Befu clarifies that the particular argument presented by Kōyama and Miyagi,
among others, is representative of a negative approach of Nihonjinron, for it emphasizes negative
ecological conditions like “the smallness of the island nation and the cold and harsh climate.”74
In contrast, Chikamatsu characterizes Japan’s climate as “‘mild (on’wa),’ ‘subtle (himyō),’ and
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‘delicate (sensai).’”75 This type of environment, Chikamatsu argues, creates a “unique literary
esthetic…with its distinct sense of seasonality” manifested excellently in haiku poetry.76 This
“basically benign” image of Japan’s environment is another part of the ecologically-oriented
Nihonjinron discourse.77 Though determining which approach is more “truthful” is outside the
scope of this paper, Befu’s analysis illustrates how writers derive and relate culture and identity
to their particular environment.
Morris-Suzuki provides another analysis of how the environment is used for creating
specific narratives tying people to their environment and explaining cultural phenomena. Instead
of just mapping out the ecologically-oriented aspect of Nihonjinron, Morris-Suzuki concentrates
on how writers and peoples use discourse-derived imagery to form national boundaries and
identities.78 The vision of a national landscape forms an integral basis for individual and national
identity, for example U.S. citizens conceive of their nation in geographical terms as illustrated by
the lyrics of the patriotic song “America the Beautiful.”79 The national images depicted in
cultural works such as songs, poetry, literature, and so forth produce a geographical space which
“houses” the nation.80
As explored above, a variety of writers and scholars in Japan have outlined the
relationship between culture and environment, fashioning a geographical space known as
“Japan” in the process. Morris-Suzuki notes how the anthropologist Ishida Eiichirō defined “the
essence of Japanese culture in terms of a unique national feeling for nature.”81 This sentiment is
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echoed by the archaeologist Yasuda Yoshinori, who argued that “mountain forests” are a
defining feature of Japanese culture.82 For Yasuda, Europe represents a civilization oriented
around deforestation while Japan is a civilization oriented around forests.83 Both the policies and
measures taken by the Japanese state and people to preserve natural landscapes as well as Shintō
beliefs are evidence for Yasuda of a civilization that is intimately connected to its forest
environment.84 Yasuda argues that the coexistence between Japan and its environment can
become a model for other nations to harmonize with their environment and move away from a
conflict-orientated relationship with nature.85
The historian Lynn White also argues that Japan’s relationship with nature is harmonious
and different from Western attitudes.86 White attributes Christian theology in the West with
perpetuating a mentality of humanity versus nature.87 In the Eastern religions/beliefs, such as
Zen Buddhism, White sees humans as integrated as equals, and part of, a “wider natural order.”88
Japan became associated with an image of a society that exists in harmony with nature and any
potential corruption of such an image is explained away by blaming Western influence.89 Though
Morris-Suzuki is skeptical of such an interpretation, seeing as Japan was able to adapt itself to
industrialization processes introduced by Western nations without being tied to the ideological
framework espoused by ecologically-oriented Nihonjinron writers.90 Instead of focusing on the
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conflict between actual historical processes and discursive processes, we can assess how national
narratives and identities are continually perpetuated in spite of such discrepancies.
To illustrate this point, Morris-Suzuki also analyzes Watsuji’s Fūdo and the way in which
it framed the creation of Japanese cultural works as a byproduct of Japanese society’s
relationship to nature. Just as Befu noted Watsuji’s ecological classifications and his view of
Japan as a mixture of monsoon and Artic conditions, Morris-Suzuki argues that Watsuji
formulated a synthesis capable of incorporating the changing relation between Japanese culture
and the environment.91 Not only did Watsuji argue that the climate of Japan created “a distinctive
and complex sensitivity to nature, vividly represented in Japanese art, architecture, and
literature,” but he derived a Japanese character or mentality from the environment.92
The climate’s components, Artic and monsoon, mentioned by both Befu and MorrisSuzuki is the foundation of Watsuji’s vision of Japanese human relationships.93 Watsuji states:
In these conditions of powerful sunlight and plentiful moisture, tropical plants flourish
here in abundance. The summer landscape hardly differs from that of the tropics. Its
outstanding representative is rice. On the other hand, the cold weather and lower moisture
of winter means that the plants of the cold regions flourish in equal abundance. Their
chief representative is wheat. So the wide earth is covered in winter with wheat and
winter grasses, and in summer with rice and summer grasses. But those plants that do not
change with the seasons must embody duality within their own forms. The sight of the
tropical bamboo weighed down with snow is often cited as a symbol of the Japanese
landscape, but the bamboo, which has learned to bear the weight of snow, is itself
different from the tropical bamboo. It has turned into Japanese bamboo, which is flexible
and can be drawn with a curved line.94
This is illustrative of how a geographical space is depicted and how characteristics identified
with a nation and people are derived. Watsuji characterizes the duality of Japan’s climate, and
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likewise the Japanese people, as a mixture of “passion and calm, flexibility and strength.”95
Japan is neither wholly monsoon climate nor Artic climate, it is instead a mixture that
incorporates both into a unique existence.96 Just like the “tropical bamboo” becomes “Japanese
bamboo,” so too are the elements of Japanese culture never simply native or foreign, they
become Japanese through their incorporation into Japanese culture.97 Such is the connection
between being and space as depicted in Watsuji’s Fūdo, a text which Morris-Suzuki argues still
exerts a notable appeal and influence since the eighteenth-century in Japanese perceptions of
Japan as a “spatial entity.”98
The analysis of Japan’s environmental conditions helps illustrate a notion of Japanese
identity that does not originate from the kind of historical-political context of the Kokutai no
Hongi. The ecological aspect of the Nihonjinron discourse provides an imagery and framework
capable of depicting a national identity and narrative. The “spatial entity” that is known as
“Japan” and Japanese culture itself are perceived as the products of their environmental
conditions. While the claim that Japanese culture reflects Japan’s natural environment is
understandable, the formation of a national imagery depends upon the representation of the
human-nature relationship in culture as much as it does on the actual human-nature relationship.
Likewise, Morris-Suzuki’s criticism of writers who overlook Japan’s industrialization and
continued encroachment of natural spaces illustrates the tension between the discourse of
Nihonjinron and actual historical changes.99
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Part 2: Japan’s Social Structure in Nihonjinron
While the ecological approach to Nihonjinron provides us with an understanding of
national identity that is linked to a geographical spaces, the formation of social structures
provides another discursive approach for understanding Japanese identity. A component of the
social structure Nihonjinron discourse is the role of Japan’s “subsistence economy.” Focusing on
writers such as Sabata Toyoyuki, Tamaki Akira, and Tsukuba Hisaharu, Befu notes how these
writers, among others, accept the truism that wet-rice cultivation necessitated the formation of
Japan’s “village corporacy.”100 According to Tamaki, the intensive agricultural activities of
ancient Japan required cooperation and facilitated the creation of tightly-knit, perhaps even
“oppressively tyrannical,” communities which demanded “conformity, consensus, and
cooperation” and did not allow members to express “individuality or assert their rights.”101 To
belong to a village, oriented around wet-rice cultivation, meant being part of a greater collective
around which one’s identity was oriented, if not even founded upon.
To further elaborate this discussion, Befu analyzes another common point of comparison
that writers use for contrasting Japan with “the West,” the discussion of the “pastoral economy”
versus the “agrarian economy.”102 According to this argument, the pastoral economy prevailed in
the West and facilitated the roots of “individualism” by placing importance on the individual
ownership of herds and grazing land.103 This inversely impeded the formation of the “oppressive
corporate community and corporate family structure” required for wet-rice cultivation.104 In the
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more agriculturally-inclined farming communities of Japan, the corporate village fostered amae
“甘え” or the Japanese propensity for “psychological interdependence” and the “closely knit
kindship units of Japan.”105 Developing upon these theories, the Ishida Eiichirō argued that the
pastoral economy is responsible for the monotheism of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, which
all arose in a “pastoral context,” and forms a fundamental component of the nature of European
civilization and the “core personality” of Europeans themselves.106 Writers like Ishida, Araki,
and Iwasaki, argue that in contrast to Western individualism, derived from the pastoral economy,
the Japanese agrarian economy formed the basis of Japan’s group-orientation.107
This particular aspect of Japanese culture, its supposed “group-orientation,” is one of the
more popularly known images of Japanese society. Japan’s “groupism,” as Befu puts it or
“collectivism,” has been used as a model by numerous scholars for studying topics such as
Japanese family structure, master-disciple relationships in martial arts, Japanese company
organization, and so forth.108 The political scientist, Nobutaka Ike argued that to understand the
political processes of Japan requires a prior understanding of Japanese group-orientated
behavior.109 Yet, while there are many Japanese scholars and writers who use this salient feature
of Japanese culture in their own works, the popular acceptance by Western scholars and publics
has had a role in perpetuating this particular social ideology.110 Collectivism is translated as
shūdan shugi “集団主義” in Japanese, though it has a much more neutral connotation than the
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English term.111 While Japan is conceptualized as a “collectivist” nation, the West is seen as a
predominantly “individualistic” sphere. The term for individualism in Japanese is kojin shugi “個
人主義” which strongly implies “selfishness and egotism at the expense of others.”112 Yet, while
the English term “collectivism” denotes an Orientalist conceptualization of Japan, which
likewise fuels self-Orientalization by Nihonjinron writers who uncritically accept Western ideas,
the Japanese term kojin shugi is a by-product of the similar process of Japan being defined and
defining itself as the opposite of the West.113
Whether one derives Japan’s “collectivism” from the environment, subsistence economy,
or from rural origins, Befu notes that one is engaging in a popular exercise among Nihonjinron
writers.114 Watsuji Tetsurō likewise writes in regards to Japanese social structure, though not
identically to writers like Iwasaki Takaharu, Kenmochi Takehiko, or Tamaki Akira who derive
collectivism as explained above. Watsuji does not derive, as Befu puts it “in a casual sense,” the
corporate community from wet-rice cultivation, but he does consider Japan’s kinship system of
ie “家,” or family/household, to be “monsoonish” in nature.115 Watsuji relates the ecological
aspect of Nihonjinron to the socio-political dimension of the discourse, for Watsuji connects the
ie to the state by arguing how filial piety in the former is akin to national loyalty in the latter.
Extending this further, one is a member of the ie, the most immediate totality, and the state, the
ultimate totality, represented by the emperor, to whom one owes loyalty.116 Thus, society is
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“structured” like a family and all the subjects of the nation must ultimately be loyal to the
emperor, who is the head of the nation. Though this particular line of argumentation adheres
more to Anderson’s conception of “imagined community” than it does to the collectivism
discourse.
What Watsuji’s approach demonstrates is that the approach to topics by Nihonjinron
writers are as varied as the people writing, for Befu notes how other writers like Inuta Mitsuru,
Kawamoto Akira, and Maniwa Mitsuyuki do not derive Japan’s group-orientation from Japan’s
rural background either.117 Among these other writers, Nakane Chie is known for her work
Japanese Society which sets down the defining criteria of Japanese groups, which Befu
summarizes as:
(1) the notion of ‘frame,’ which she defines as ‘a criterion that sets a boundary and gives
a common basis to a set of individuals who are allocated to or involved in it, (2) the
predominance of vertical relationships, (3) exclusivity of membership, that is, one
belongs to one and only one group, and (4) hostility toward outsiders.118
From this set of criteria, one is intended to conceptualize Japanese social groups as rigid,
defined, and localized. Inuta contrasts group-orientated societies and individualistic societies,
noting how the latter emphasizes “individual rights, duties, and conscience” while the former is
absent of these characteristics.119 To be a member of a group in Japanese society is to
continuously impose upon each other, for this is what defines one’s identity and membership to a
“desinty-sharing corporate community” or unmei kyōdōutai “運命共同体.”120
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In order to further elaborate how membership is actualized within the discourse of
Japanese society, Befu analyzes the psychological interdependence of Japanese hierarchicallyorganized groups through the concept of amae. According to Befu, within an organization, the
“paternalistic leader” of an organization serves to “satisfy both the affective and the instrumental
needs of the organization’s members.”121 Subordinates seek “emotional satisfaction by prevailing
and depending upon their social superiors” and the reverse of superior to subordinate dependence
constitute the dynamics of the vertical organization of Japanese social groups.122 Amae itself is
etiologically connected back to the mother-child relationship, which is seen as the core of the
socialization process in Japan.123 When discussing the normative practices of Japanese social
relations, it is important to discuss the concepts of on “恩” and giri “義理” which respectively
translate to “indebtedness” and “duty.”124 Within the dynamics of superior-subordinate, the
“instrumental and expressive provision” given by a superior becomes a sense of on for the
subordinate.125 This then creates a “normative obligation” that is a moral imperative of repaying
one’s debt or fulfilling one’s giri, often expressed by a subordinate through loyal service to a
superior.126
As a consequence of the relationship dynamic explored above, Japanese social virtues
emphasizes harmony, cooperation, and conformity while traits and behaviors relating to openconflict and competition are taboo.127 Social ritual and behavior are oriented around reducing, if
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not fully eliminating, open-conflict and embarrassment. Actions and characteristics adversely
affecting the total mutual affective satisfaction among members are sanctioned via ostracism,
shame, and other means.128 The ideal form of social groups then is having all members selflessly
oriented around the goals of the group with virtuous superiors and devoted subordinates. While
there might be many commonalities between this ideal and other cultures’ ideals, this particular
notion arises from the context of the Nihonjinron discourse.
The notion of collectivism or shūdan shugi, however, is not completely unchallenged in
the Japanese Nihonjinron discourse, for sociologist Hamaguchi Eshun focuses on a concept
called “contextualism” or kanjin shugi “肝心主義” or aidagara shugi “間柄主義.”129 This
conceptualizes the individual in manner that emphasizes their “total situation” as a basic unit of
society rather than stripping a person down to their individual self.130 Thus, the methodology for
analyzing Japan through either an individualistic or collectivist approach is already marred with
“methodological individualism” which distorts people’s understanding of Japan’s social
structure.131
The issue for Hamaguchi is that shūdan shugi assumes that the individual and the
collective are pitted against each other and marks the prioritization of the group over the
individual. Returning to the discourse of corporate social structure, Hamaguchi advocates a
notion of “corporativism” or kyōdō dantai shugi “共同団体主義” which, for Hamaguchi, is
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uniquely Japanese.132 Instead of conceptualizing the individual and the collective as antithetical,
Hamaguchi notes that the Japanese individual ties their selfhood in unity, or ittaika “一体化,” to
the group such that the goals of the group are the goals of the individual member.133 This aspect
of working in unity, as opposed to subordinating oneself to the demands of the group, is radical
in that it challenges the predominately Western-influenced writers of Nihonjinron, who have
traditionally conceptualized the individual in manner marred by Western ideology. Though there
are aspects of both Hamaguchi and various other writers’ representations of Japanese social
structure which overlap, Hamaguchi’s argument attempts to shift the discourse away from
Western conceptualizations and seeks to present an image of societal structure that is “uniquely”
Japanese.
Part 3: The Language of Nihonjinron
Language plays a central role in ethnic identity, for it is the means through which one
gains access to the worldview and thought processes of those who speak it.134 This old
argumentation is one which, Befu notes, has been invoked commonly in anthropology and other
disciplines.135 The Nihonjinron writers, linguists and non-linguists alike, argue similarly with
regards to the Japanese language. Though some of the claims regarding the Japanese language fit
within a larger discourse concerning all languages, Befu notes how Nihonjinron writers consider
Japanese uniqueness something which can only be expressed in Japanese as another affirmation
of their claims.136 Language is “at the core of Nihonjinron,” Befu argues, for the uniqueness of
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Japanese culture and character, and thus ultimately identity, can only be properly expressed in
the Japanese language.137 For linguist and non-linguist writers, the Japanese language is only
natively spoken in Japan and all Japanese people in Japan can speak Japanese natively. 138 This
forms the foundation of an identity rooted in language.
Kindaichi Haruhiko argues that “Japanese is an isolated language” and is not related to
any other language group, noting how dissimilar it is from “Ainu, Korean, Tibeto-Burmese,
Ural-Altaic, and Malayo-Polynesian.”139 For Kindaichi, the lack of affiliation and proper
linguistic consensus only further affirms how Japanese is a unique language in its own right.140
Befu adds that since there is a supposedly “perfect isomorphism” between Japanese language
speakers and bearers of Japanese culture, then the uniqueness of the language is also reflected
and shaped by the uniqueness of the culture and people. 141
Given that the “one-to-one correspondence” of Japanese is not replicated in other
linguistic contexts, then one should not think it possible to derive unique characteristics about the
people or culture from other languages.142 To expand on this linguistic determinism of Japan’s
cultural uniqueness, Tsunoda Tadanobu, a medical doctor, found differences in the way the
hemispheres of the brain related to speech functioned in native Japanese speakers and native
Western language speakers.143 What Tsunoda derived from the study he conducted is that the
section of the brain dealing with “logos” and “pathos” were integrated in the Japanese thought
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process while they were contrasted or opposite in the European thought process.144 Though this
study has not been accepted by the wider medical community, since it used a rather small sample
size and its methodology and execution have been called into question.145 However, despite its
flaws, Tsunoda’s research gained publicity as it marked a form of scientific verification of
Nihonjinron views related to the Japanese language’s uniqueness.
The linguistic Nihonjinron writers focus on deriving characteristics from the Japanese
language that are then connected to Japanese culture and the Japanese people themselves. As
mentioned above, the very thought processes of the Japanese mind are considered unique given
the way the mind is structured. Less controversial aspects of this discourse entail how language
reflects social structure, for Kindaichi notes how a variety of terms related to Japanese kinship
groups connote unique social meanings.146 Citing the way in which terms such as older brother
or onii-san “お兄さん” and older sister or onee-san “お姉さん” as well as younger brother or
otōto “弟” and younger sister or imōto “妹” denote social status.147 While it is common to use a
person’s proper name in English, even among siblings, for the Japanese, older siblings will refer
to younger siblings by first name as a means of denoting their superior status while younger
siblings will default to using the term onii-san, onee-san, or one of their variants in deference.148
For Kindaichi, language and culture mirror each other and what we see in the former is reflected
in the latter and vice versa.
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While there are other aspects of the discourse to consider, such as locality and its function
in Japanese language, the logical structure of the language, and the communication patterns of
nonverbal communication, I have given language a brief overlook in order to set up a larger
discussion on culture. Though I have analyzed particular aspects of the Nihonjinron discourse,
which all inherently relate to culture, an analysis of Japanese culture itself reveals just how
intimately Japanese identity is tied to culture. While cultural variance from prefecture to
prefecture exists, the prevailing ideology of “Japaneseness” constitutes the core of Japan’s
cultural hegemony under which variance is subsumed. As noted with the linguistic discourse,
controversy does not inhibit writers from asserting various, even conflicting, claims with others
who are engaged in the same topic. It seems that so long as a writer is working within the
parameters of nebulously defined framework of consensus, then their work is to some extent
affirmed by the larger discursive enterprise as valid or worth considering.
Part 4: Culture as Identity
Morris-Suzuki notes that the “very idea of ‘culture’ itself” is quite modern, being an
intellectual ferment of European enlightenment, and only making its way into Japanese in the
second half of the nineteenth century.149 While this does not mean that culture was not discussed
or relevant to pre-Meiji Japanese intellectuals, the sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt notes that there
was no “obvious sense of a sharp diving line between ‘nature’ and ‘culture.’”150 In regards to the
discussion of Japanese culture or Nihon bunka “日本文化,” how are we to analyze Japanese
conceptions of culture that pre-date the introduction of Western discourses and ideology? To
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trace the discourse that developed in pre-Meiji era Japan requires an understanding of the
influence China exerted as a center of culture and religion on its neighbors Korea and Japan.
These two regions, different political entities in various regards from the modern nation-states,
were connected to each other in regards to migration movements and cultural/ideological
diffusion.
This particular relationship, between Korea and Japan, however, is not emphasized as
much in the larger Nihonjinron discourse. Befu notes how Japanese archeologists were not
emphasizing the similarities between the Yayoi and Tomb periods (2300 B.C.E. to 1400 B.C.E.),
despite both Korean and Japanese cultures expressing many of the same cultural elements of the
time.151 However, for Korean prehistorians and cultural historians, the commonalities between
Korean culture and Japanese culture has advanced a view of marking Japan as “a mere
appendage to Korea.”152 Though this particular outlook is expressive of Korean nationalism and
is unlikely to have much sway with Nihonjinron writers.
That Chinese culture, religion, and language affected Japan, however, is less
controversial given that China was the regional hegemon before Western nations encroached into
the “Far East.”153 The early Japanese socio-political structure was influenced by Chinese
concepts such as bunka and bunmei “文明,” which are dichotomous terms denoting “culture”
and “civilization” respectively.154 Politics and society were structured around bun “文” and bu
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“武,” or the scholarly arts and martial arts. And though the intricacies of Japanese socio-political
structuring and ideology are important for understanding key aspects of this research, an even
more elaborate analysis of Japanese political history is outside the scope of this paper. What is of
particular interest is how the phrase, and ideology, of bunmei evolved into the phrase bunmei
kaika “文明開化” or “civilization and enlightenment” during the Meiji period.155 This phrase,
Morris-Suzuki notes, was coined by Japan’s “Westernizers” to describe the series of social
reforms and policies that were being enacted in order to transform Japanese society.156
During the Meiji Restoration (1869 to 1912), Western ideology and discourses were
being imported into the country by the nation’s scholars, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi who
introduced a Westernized notion of bunmei into use.157 The European discourse on culture and
civilization introduced into Meiji-era Japan is worth considering, for scholars were divided over
the definition and connotations of the terms “culture” and “civilization.” Morris-Suzuki provides
a brief glimpse into the discourse by looking at how the scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt saw
culture as “the control of nature by science and technology” and civilization as “the improvement
of human customs and manners.”158 Other scholars of the time, however, argued that culture is
the “intangible world of social values and ideals” and that civilization is “the tangible
achievements of human science and technology.”159 The distinction being raised by European
scholars did not only concern “nonmaterial values and material systems,” but also involved the
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“spatial and temporal visions of difference.”160 According to Morris-Suzuki, this discourse
outlined the distinction as:
Culture, in other words, was the realm of spatial difference—a world divided by the
differing social mores of distinct communities—while civilization was the realm of
time—a universal trajectory toward which different societies moved at different
speeds.161
It was this particular discourse and ideology that shaped the meaning of the phrase bunmei kaika
and which influenced Fukuzawa’s writings on bunmei.162
While one might question why I have not examined the particulars of what we
“traditionally” associate with culture, such as ritual beliefs, sports, literature, or the like, it is
because taking these manifestations of cultural expression as representative of Japanese culture
begets the question of “what makes it Japanese?” From the center of cultural hegemony, the
periphery becomes the alienated, it becomes “Othered.” In the case of Meiji Japan, the centers of
modernization became the preferred image of Japan while the outer-lying regions of Japan
became cites of backwardness.163 The rise of nationalism would eventually propel the discourse
on culture forward and could be seen in the works of the philosopher Nishida Kitarō, whose
work detailed the relationship of environment and subject.164 For Nishida, Japanese
consciousness emerged from the relationship of the Japanese people and the territory that they
occupied.165 At the core of this Japanese consciousness was the abstract figure of the emperor,
who transcended the “contradictions of selfhood” and who represented the “now” which entailed
both past and future.166And though Nishida was against transforming Japan into an “an
160
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unreflective ‘subject’ of a drama of imperialism,” he emphasized the “destiny of Japanese culture
in a new world order.”167 This echoes the prevailing socio-political ideology that took root
during the increased militarization and imperialism of Japan during the 1930s and 1940s.
While there are many facets of the Nihonjinron discourse concerning culture, one should
note how the meta-narrative of cultural supremacy and cultural identity were begin formulated in
various social institutions. While the Japanese intelligentsia and military of the Meiji-era, Taishō
(1912 to 1926), and early Shōwa (1926 to 1989) focused on reforming Japanese society at all
levels in order to assert Japan in the international arena, they also became involved with the
production of national identity.168 Returning to Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented tradition,” the
creation of tradition was part of Japanese institutions and intellectuals’ attempts to define not
only themselves in relation to the Western powers, but also to define for Japanese people what it
meant to be “Japanese”.169 The ethnographer Yanagita Kunio redefined how “culture” was
understood in a Japanese discourse that had long been influenced and shaped by Western
ideology and Orientalism.170 For Yanagita, culture was “the existing state of harmony of many
elements both old and new” and Japanese culture, in particular, is “dynamic and adaptive.”171
Yanagita, however, also fused nationalism with culture studies, for he saw the attachment
certain regions of Japan had with “local culture” as inhibiting the development of Japan into a
proper nation.172 Indeed, the production of culture and national tradition, embodying a
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hegemonic sense of “Japaneseness” was even a necessary activity, which Morris-Suzuki sums up
as:
“Culture,” in short, must be something national, because defining it in any other way
would erode social harmony; so the definition slips quietly from being a description of
actual social belief s and practices in all their dynamic complexity, to being a description
of the beliefs and practices which must be created: a utopian goal symbolized, for
Yanagita, by the traditional festival (matsuri) in which all social division dissolves in the
ecstasy of communal celebration.173
The focus on embodying a central essence of “Japaneseness” is important for scholars like
Yanagita, who believed that Japan could only “progress” with a clear image of what Japan ought
to be like. That the whole of Nihonjinron discourse is both national studies and a reaction to
Western imperialism and Orientalism is made more evident by a continued insistence by
Nihonjinron writers to define the parameters of a Japanese uniqueness true of all Japanese people
and culture. The creation of a national identity, then must supersede local identity and must
subsume or subjugate any variance that deviates from the established norm. However, the
concern over forming a national identity is in relation to the “imagined community” to whom
that identity would have meaning. Thus, to understand yet another dimension of Nihonjinron
discourse, and therefore how Japanese identity is constructed, one should analyze how writers
and institutions transpose cultural uniqueness onto the people themselves.
Part 5: The Idea of Yamato Minzoku “大和民族”

If the grouping of culture and race strikes any reader as odd, then it would be because the
old method for conceptualizing one’s racial and cultural identity were not as distinguished in the
past as they are in contemporary times. While one might argue that one’s race or ethnicity does
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not determine their cultural participation, understanding, or identity, Japanese discourses
concerning nationalism, Nihonjinron, and identity often conflate the two or regard them as
inextricably linked. Race and racism, as contemporary Western readers and scholars understand
them, are incredibly complicated and intricate mechanisms and ideologies of social stratification
founded upon phenotypic differences/markers and the superior-inferior group characteristics,
values, and stereotypes derived and imposed upon bodies from said differences. While this is a
simplified definition of racism and race, we require some model for proceeding with this
analysis. The racial discourse of the West, its role in social formation and pervasive influence
over all aspects of Western ideology, ground it, not exclusively in a Western context, but within
the historical processes of the West. And while we are able to trace the advancement and
diffusion of these mechanisms and ideologies to other regions of the world subjected to Western
colonialism and imperialism, we cannot transpose the Western discourse of race, with all its
intricacies and peculiarities, onto non-Western countries. If we are to understand how racial
discourse evolved in Japan it is crucial to know what the discourse was prior to the importation
of Western ideology and then to understand how the changing Western discourse influenced the
Japanese discourse.
The scholar Timon Screech argues that “Japan has always considered itself ethnically
pure, and in this it draws a distinction with China and Korea, held to be racially diverse.”174
Though this appears to return to the discourse on homogeneity detailed earlier in the paper, it is
important to note that the social stratification of Japanese society prior to the Meiji Restoration
emphasized locality in relation to the “center” represented by the emperor and the Shogunate
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(government ruled by Shogun). Morris-Suzuki conceptualizes this as “an inherently unequal
social order where everyone theoretically occupied a place in an intricate galaxy of status
spiraling outward from a center.”175 This social stratification is reflected in the dynamics of
center-periphery ideology, the more peripheral one is, the more marginal and “Othered” one
becomes. Pre-Meiji Japan heavily emphasized the virtue and order of the center in relation to
which the marginal members of society, such as social outcastes and foreigners, and outer
peoples, like the Ainu of northeastern Japan and Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyūans of the Ryūkyū
Islands, were seen as subversive and un-Japanese.176
The socio-political orientation of pre-Meiji Japanese society did not incorporate the
concept of distinct political rights and did not exclude people from having those rights on the
basis of race.177 Morris-Suzuki instead prompts us to understand the concept of political ordering
as “an infinite set of social gradation defined in terms of ideas of social function, order,
propriety, and political submission.” 178 And though there is a particular social group, the
hisabetsu burakumin, who challenge this assertion of there being no racial discrimination in PreMeiji Japan, this topic will be addressed later in the paper. Given that the structure of social
stratification in Pre-Meiji Japan did not rely on concepts of race or present us with a definite,
albeit Western, example of racism, Japanese racial discourse was either incorporated into an
even more encompassing social ideology or only became prevalent during the Meiji Restoration.
The Meiji government sought to pursue policies of “Westernization” in order to assert
Japan’s self-determination as a nation and prevent its own colonization by Western powers
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during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The old feudal institutions and policies of the
preceding Tokugawa government, with its sumptuary laws, internal immigration policies, and
ban on Christianity, were abolished.179 The Edict Abolishing Ignoble Classes or Senmin
Haishirei “賤民廃止令, also known as the Emancipation Edict or Kaihōrei “解放令,” was
passed in 1871 and granted equal status as “Japanese” to all social groups and outcastes. MorrisSuzuki, however, argues that this entailed being a member of “a clearly bounded nation-state to
which all owed an equal duty of loyalty” and in which the “equality of allegiance” did not confer
to “equality of rights.”180 The socio-political structure of Meiji Japan, while democratizing to an
extent, never intended to adopt any full egalitarian social ideology, for Japan’s leaders gravitated
toward a view of the nation as a family, expressed as ie or kazoku “家族.”181 This model allowed
the government and leaders to justify the new societal changes, since like a family, all people
were members of a single community, but, just like a family, the members have different rights
and duties.182 Extending this model to the nation-state itself asserted the emperor as the apex of
Japanese society and redefined them as the “father of the nation” or the head of the “familystate” or kazoku kokka “家族国家.”183

In regards to the discourse on race, the Meiji intelligentsia began adapting the imported
Western ideologies concerning race or jinshu “人種” and then later those concerning the
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concepts of volk, ethnic groups, or minzoku “民族.”184 Westernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi
popularized these Western racial ideas in Japan, employing not he terms of jinshu and bunmei
together.185 The discourse on culture and civilization was likewise marked by what MorrisSuzuki calls “two axes for the definition of difference” of which the first entailed “geographical
space.”186 The ideology of national solidarity and national superiority allowed “ideologues” to
perpetuate concepts which linked people either by “blood bonds of common origin,” race, or
“common language or traditions,” ethnicity.187
The second axis was “time,” embodied in the discourse of “progress” in which all of
humanity was proceeding upon a single, universal trajectory.188 The ideology of social
Darwinism would further complicate these two interwoven axes by promoting the concept that
different races were representative of different stages in the march toward “civilization.”189 This
particularly shifted the perspective of Japanese people toward peripheral groups within Japan’s
boundaries, like the Ainu, who were no longer perceived as “foreign” but instead as
“backward.”190 Furthermore, the rise of Japanese imperialism in the surrounding regions of
Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria required ideological justification in order to legitimize Japan’s
expansion.191 Though the discourse incorporated a number of arguments, three main forms of
ideology emerged: the first emphasizing the racial superiority of the Japanese in relation to the
conquered subjects; the second stressing the racial or cultural commonalities of the colonized
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and the colonizers; the third asserting Japanese society as embodying a more advanced form of
modern civilization.192 Though the term used in this discourse is “race,” it refers to minzoku,
which was nebulous enough to be used in all three different contexts as race, ethnicity, or nation.
The first racial ideology advocated a conceptualization of Japan and the Japanese people
as racially pure and homogenous. Nationalist Nihonjinron writers like Hozumi Yatsuka argued
that the national body/entity or kokutai “国体” is linked by blood to the imperial family, who
themselves are descendants of the ancient divine spirits or kami “神” of Japanese Shintō “神
道.”193 And this particular line of argumentation not only created a sense of national identity
oriented around the imperial family, but assert the Japanese people’s superiority to other peoples
and nations. This ideology of purity and superiority also gave Japan a sense of a “divine
mission” to liberate other parts of Asia from Western imperialism and colonialism.194 However
well the proponents, who were co-opting pre-existing notions of Japanese cultural beliefs,
advocated this view, it did not work to reconcile Japan with its colonial subjects.195
An alternate racial view of Japan, advocated by historian Sadakichi Kita and others, was
that Japan was originally inhabited by a variety of different racial groups who were assimilated
by a single ethnic group.196 Though the subjugating group was, as Morris-Suzuki puts it,
“somewhat ill-defined,” Japanese scholars considered them the ancient relatives of the Koreans.
By assimilating the distinct racial groups living in Japan, and likewise later absorbing migrants
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from Korea and China, this group lead to the emergence of the Yamato minzoku, an archaic term
Kita used for referring to the inhabitants of Japan.197 While this theory rejects the notion of racial
purity, Kita still emphasized the role of the emperor as the descendant of the people who unified
Japan into a single cultural and political entity.198 Thus, the emperor was the metaphorical head
of the national family, not the literal blood relative like the racial purity advocates argued.199
Likewise, the uniqueness of the Japanese did not lie in their racial purity, but instead in their
ability to mold disparate elements into a unified whole, which fit the Social Darwinian concept
of group/culture struggle.200
This particular theory of racial amalgamation allowed Japan to not only preserve its own
sense of cultural superiority, with the emperor as representative of the nation-state, but promoted
an idea that all colonial subjects could successfully integrate into Japanese society. Others were
conceptualized as “incomplete Japanese” who simply needed to be assimilated into the larger
Japanese socio-political apparatus.201 Colonial subjects abroad and at home were subjected to
policies of assimilation and were tasked with adopting the Japanese language and Japanese
culture.202 This ideology also supported the notion that Japan had a mission to rescue other Asian
nations not only from Western powers, but their own cultural backwardness. The later military
government of early Shōwa Japan would embody this in their imperialistic policy of hakkō ichiu
“八紘一宇” or “the eight directions of the world under one roof.”203 With the Yamato minzoku at
the head of these other Asian countries and Japanese culture as the center, continuously
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absorbing, consuming, and transforming difference, Japan would establish a homogenous
cultural hegemony.204
However, race itself did not need to play a central role in the imperialistic ideology of
Japan nor in its colonial rule, for the third strain of this discourse focused on Japan’s advanced
civilization and culture alone.205 Scholars of the post-World War II era have noted how even
though the racial and cultural perspectives were often times conflated and interwoven, it is clear
that racial exclusion and subordination need not rely on concepts of “racial” superiority alone.206
Placing social groups on a continuum from cultural backwardness to cultural progressiveness
propelled the Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa era Japanese intelligentsia and leaders to justify social
stratification, colonialism, and militarization.207 Culture, race, and nation are heavily interwoven
and often used interchangeably when discussing groups of people, which is why the
nebulousness of the term minzoku works well within the Nihonjinron discourse. As we have
analyzed, there have been many writers and works within, and outside of, Japanese society and
throughout Japanese history that sought to define Japanese identity in terms of ecology, social
structure, language, culture, and race/ethnicity.
The Shadow Japanese Identity Casts
Nihonjinron writers and scholars like Befu, Morris-Suzuki, Dale, and others have
provided us not only with the content, but analyses of and methodologies for studying what
has/is being said about the Japanese cultural production of identity. And though it is important to
provide a meta-analysis of what I have done, it is important to reiterate that my aim is not to
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endorse the discourse nor its elements. While it is possible that some features of Nihonjinron
might be more valid than others, one should focus on the complexity and interwoven nature of
these various cultural components of identity. To derive some essence of “Japaneseness” would
be to engage in the sort of essentialist, Orientalism that Said warns is indicative of Western
imperialism and renders my focus on elaborating the parameters of Japanese identity mute. Then,
one might ask again, what does it “mean” to be Japanese? Or for something to be Japanese? The
answer does not lie in a definition nor in a universally, identifiable essence, but in an
understanding of how Japanese identity is formed by interwoven cultural and historical processes
and discourse.
The image of Japan as homogenous nation is one that is fabricated, but reified in the
interconnectedness of numerous cultural elements and institutions which construct and
perpetuate the notion of Japanese homogeneity. As argued by Hobsbawm, Yanagita, and others,
nations and peoples engage in the process of constructing their own national identity and sense
of historical continuity. The methodology employed here to analyze the Nihonjinron discourse
could very well be applied to other national studies. However, this understanding of Japanese
identity, its components and relation to cultural institutions and discourse, allows us to compare
how minority identity is created. The two groups that I will be focusing on for the remainder of
this paper will be the Zainichi Koreans and the hisabetsu burakumin. Upon analyzing these two
groups’ particular histories and identities, I will re-address Japan’s status as either a
homogenous, multicultural, or multiethnic nation.
While it is possible to approach the topic of identity from a variety of methodologies, I
want to emphasize the relational dimension of mainstream identity to marginalized identity.
Incorporated within this particular discourse are strains of minority self-determination and
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identity construction, though these elements will be contextualized within the larger apparatus of
Japanese society. Having presented these considerations, I will attempt to replicate a similar
analysis for these minority groups as I did for Japanese identity, avoiding essentialism and
acknowledging the potential biases of my approach.
Colonization, War, and Resistance: Koreans and Zainichi Koreans in the Japanese
Cultural Landscape
The Zainichi Koreans or Resident Koreans “在日韓国人” are by various measures, one
of Japan’s oldest minority groups. While the term “Zainichi Korean” is useful for describing the
ethnic Korean population of Japan, it can denote either a Japanese citizen or permanent resident,
who arrived in Japan prior to 1945 or who is a descendant of said Korean population. Yet, the
relationship between Korea and Japan, as indicated by the previous exploration of Nihonjinron,
is far from benign or harmonious. Japan has long attempted to exert political, economic, and
cultural control over its neighbor.208 Korea’s status as an independent region, let alone as a selfdetermined nation, has long been conceptually contested by pre-World War II Japanese leaders
and scholars.209 Yet, how has Korea-Japan relations changed over time? What prompted the
image shift of Korea in the Japanese cultural landscape? What aspects of Japanese social
structure and ideology help us understand how Korean identity is shaped by Japanese discourse?
What does it mean to be Zainichi Korean in contemporary Japan? These are some of the
questions that will guide my analysis of this particular inquiry into Korea-Japan relations and
Korean identity in relation to Japanese cultural hegemony.
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The scholar Jeffrey Bayliss explores the relationship between Korea and Japan from the
rise of the Meiji government until after World War II in his work On the Margins of Empire:
Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan. Bayliss is concerned with a similar
analysis of the Korean and hisabetsu burakumin communities in Japan, their struggles for
liberation, their experiences with discrimination, and the ideology and discourses creating and
perpetuating mechanisms of oppressions.210 Furthermore, Bayliss is concerned with the
proximity of these two groups and their commonalities and differences as Japanese minority
groups.211 Given that the two groups often shared the same space and experienced nearly
identical forms of discrimination, a narrative of solidarity would naturally develop.212 However,
it is this precise assumption, which some scholars take, that Bayliss is concerned with critiquing.
Noting how scholars of the minority groups often exclude the other group when recounting one
of the group’s narrative, Bayliss asserts that scholars are failing to account for the influences
these two marginalized people have had on each other.213 Scholars who speak about the
hisabetsu burakumin or Koreans also conflate particular sub-sections of the groups as
representative of the whole, ignoring that in challenging Japanese homogeneity, they construct
homogenous representations of the minority groups.214
However, with these considerations in mind, Bayliss examines the intricacies of
discrimination and the Japanese discourse that perpetuated ideologies that “Othered” these two
groups. To elaborate on the particulars of Korean identity and its relation to the narratives and
ideologies created, maintained, and perpetuated by Japan, we can begin with an analysis of the
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Japanese cultural imagination of Korea. There are many aspects of Bayliss’s analysis and
methodology that provide valuable insight and directions for understanding the role of Korea in
Japan and the discourses that arose in both communities. While it is possible to perpetuate
problematic representations of peoples and nations when deconstructing ideological tenets, it is
important to recognize that facets of argumentations or discourse are not representative of some
“absolute truth” regarding either the Koreans or the Japanese.
Korean-Japanese History: Subordination through Discourse and Culture
While Bayliss only briefly mentions the mythological subjugation of the Three Korean
Kingdoms by Japan’s Empress Jingū (169 C.E. to 269 C.E.) within the larger context of Japanese
scholars associating the outcaste eta with Korea, he notes it follows a trend in Japanese
discourse.215 Though I will analyze this larger discourse later, one should note how interwoven
Korea is with “otherness” for the Japanese intelligentsia. The fact that within the Japanese
cultural landscape there exists a connection, of subjugator to subjugated, between Japan and
Korea is central to this analysis. The veracity of the account is not as important as the meaning
that it has for Japanese people who consider it part of their cultural worldview. It is indicative of
a mode of conceptualizing Korea as subordinate to Japan or which marks Korea as a former
possession, and the Korean people former subjects, of Japan.216
The history of Japan and Korea dates back millennia and incorporates a number of
historical processes such as population movements from the latter to the former, cultural and
religious diffusion from Korea to Japan, and Korea connecting Japan to the rest of Asia.217
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However, proximity has also been a source of conflict and following the unification of the
disparate Japanese feudal domains by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537 to 1598), Korea was involved
in Hideyoshi’s attempted incursion into Ming China. The Joseon government, a Chinese ally,
refused to allow Japanese troops to land on Korean soil and would not grant Hideyoshi’s army
free-passage into China. This defiance prompted Hideyoshi to initiate an invasion of Korea
(1592 to 1598). The invasions, however, ended in failure and the Toyotomi Clan lost much of its
political power and influence following the costly venture and the death of Hideyoshi.
Afterwards, Bayliss notes a shift in political relations between Japan and Korea during
the Tokugawa period, as the Tokugawa government sought to normalize relations with the
country.218 Given that Korea was a heavily Confucian state, the Neo-Confucian Tokugawa
government and Japanese scholars held Korean culture and intellectual achievements in high
regard.219 However, the ideological conception of Korea as subordinate to Japan also morphed,
for the Tokugawa government was interested in getting Korea to send embassies to Japan. The
government hoped to portray the diplomatic missions as paying homage to the Shogun, thereby
promoting the legitimacy of the government and projecting Japan as superior to Korea.220
Though the government took measures to mask any sense of Japanese arrogance, socio-political
ideology began to change with the rise of the national learning or kokugaku “国学” school of
thought.221
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This intellectual movement sought to purge Japan of degenerative foreign influence,
including Chinese and Korean Confucianism.222 Thus, we return to scholars like Yamaguchi
Kōjū and Aoyagi Tanenobu, who attempted to connect Korea with the lowly pariah of Japanese
society.223 The discourse concerning Korea would continue to change as the Tokugawa
government lost power and the Meiji administration seized control of the nation. Following the
pattern of social and political reform in Japan, the Meiji oligarchs redefined their position to
Korea and promoted the ideology of “subjugating Korea” or Seikanron “征韓論.”224 In 1876, the
Meiji government forced Korea to engage in trade and diplomacy via the Kanghwa Treaty and
though Bayliss thinks it would be incorrect to see these events as indicative of a “fully developed
imperialistic drive toward controlling Korea,” he does see it as a dramatic departure from the
Tokugawa rulers’ policies towards Korea.225
Likewise, the political policies of the Meiji government coincided with the intellectual
changes in Japanese discourse concerning Korea. The older Tokugawa kokugaku scholars’
derision of Korea morphed into a full rejection of Korean traditional culture by Meiji-era
scholars like Fukuzawa Yukichi.226 Fukuzawa’s emphasis on “civilization and enlightenment” or
bunmei kaika facilitated his particularly negative assessment of Korea, which he characterized as
a “small, barbaric country” that was far behind Japanese civilization.227 For scholars like
Fukuzawa, who were focused on the Westernization of Japan, anything that did not contribute to

222

Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 28.
Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 41.
224
Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, (London:
Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), 40.
225
Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 40.
226
Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 41.
227
Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 41.
223

Lopez-Duran 52

the national goal of obtaining power and asserting Japan’s self-determination to Western
imperialist powers was deemed a “harmful distraction.”228
With the continued rise of Japan’s imperial powers and absorption of Western ideology,
Korea’s position within Japanese discourse was constantly changing. The introduction of social
Darwinism in the 1870s fueled Japanese scholars in their attempts at defining and redefining
both Japan’s relation to the West, itself as a nation, and Japan’s position to the rest of Asia.229
The emphasis on group struggle and cultural struggle in social Darwinism was used by some
scholars to promote notions of eugenics and race, such as Takahashi Yoshio’s On the
Improvement of the Japanese Race, which outlined the inherent degeneracy and unhygienic
nature of the hisabetsu burakumin.230 Scholars became more adamant about locating the
hisabetsu burakumin as peripheral and foreign, equating them and Koreans as members of the
same “racial stock.”231 For Japanese social Darwinists, the “backwardness” of the hisabetsu
burakumin was indicative of the Korean’s inability to self-rule and the cultural gap between
Korea and Japan was indicative of the difference inherent in hisabetsu burakumin and their
inability to self-improve.232 The semi-egalitarian and humanistic rhetoric of the early Meiji
period, which saw the abolishment of the hisabetsu burakumin’s outcaste status, became less
prevalent as the negative qualities of the groups were blamed on the very victims of
discrimination themselves.233
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The anthropologist Fujii Kansuke, writing in 1886, published a critical article about the
eta and their connection to the Koreans.234 While the connection being made was oriented
around both groups’ consumption of meat, Fujii once again emphasized the legend of Korean
slaves and war prisoners as being the ancestors of the eta.235 This continued framing of Korea as
a traditionally subordinate entity to Japan perpetuated the idea of inherent Korean inferiority and
inability to self-rule. As discussed earlier in the paper, Japanese scholars contrasted Japan’s own
racial and cultural identity with Korea’s.236 Anthropologists Oguma Eiji and Torii Ryūzō, like
Sadakichi Kita, advocated the notion that the Japanese were a composite of different races.237
Yet, how was the discourse concerning the Japanese as an amalgamation of “non-Japanese
groups” related to the discourse disparaging hisabetsu burakumin for their supposed foreignness?
Any inconsistency was resolved by emphasizing the uniqueness of the Japanese people’s ability
to blend and assimilate disparate racial groups, unlike the hisabetsu burakumin who retained
their intrinsic foreignness.238
Bayliss argues that the concept of the “emperor-centered, homogenous Japanese nationstate: the kokutai” further ostracized peripheral groups like the hisabetsu burakumin.239 This
social structure, Bayliss continues, is not a “vertical hierarchy,” but a “concentric map of racial
purity” radiating from the emperor to the outermost fringes, inhabited by marginalized groups
like the hisabetsu burakumin.240 While Koreans were subjected to similar modes of social
stratification and discrimination, the full-brunt of Japanese cultural hegemony would only be felt
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later when Japan made Korea a national concern.241 Prior to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894
to 1895), Japanese scholars were frustrated by the seeming inability of the Korean court and
people to initiate their own “Meiji-style self-improvement program.”242 And following the
Russo-Japanese War (1904 to 1905), Japanese scholars began to propose the view of Korean
society as emblematic of “stagnation theory” or teitairon “停滞論.”243 Founded upon the social
Darwinist conception of social groups representing different stages of a continuum from
barbarity to civilization, Japanese scholars claimed that Korea was stalled at a point in
development that Japan had long surpassed.244 However, following the annexation of Korea in
1905, a new conceptualization of Korea-Japan relations entered the discursive landscape as
proponents of Korean-Japanese affinity and kinship promoted the theory of common ancestry
between Japanese and Koreans or nissen dōsoron “日鮮同祖論.”245

Although the proponents of dōsoron were more accommodating of Korea within Japan’s
cultural landscape, emphasizing things such as racial kinship and cultural contributions and
service, they recognized the superior cultural and moral qualities of the race that militarily
subjugated the Japanese Isles.246 Though scholars located the origins of the “heaven-descended”
race, or amakudari “天下り,” outside of Japan, they did not locate the origins in the Korean
Peninsula in a way that elevated Koreans.247 Rather, the imperial connection to Korea is
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reaffirmed in the supposed mythological conquest of the Korean Peninsula following the creation
of a unified, political entity in Japan.248 Yet, while Japan’s cultural superiority and uniqueness
were still affirmed by dōsoron scholars, Korean’s racial and cultural inferiority were explained
away by 1) Korean “racial stock” containing greater “inferior” elements, 2) Korea’s geographic
separation from Japan’s nourishing cultural production, or 3) Korea’s proximity to China and its
subversive culture.249 The only way for Korean’s to actualize their full potential was for them to
assimilate themselves into Japanese culture, a move advocated by many dōsoron scholars like
Kita, who considered Korea to be like a “weak branch family [buke]” of Japan, the “affluent and
stable main family [honke].”250 For Kita, not only is the main family obligated to help the branch
family, but the branch family would welcome their chance to assimilate themselves into the main
family.251 Japan would utilize its unique ability to assimilate other racial groups on the Koreans,
and since the Koreans were not a totally different racial group, they would be able to blend into
Japanese society easily. Bayliss notes that in the dōsoron discourse “race” equaled “culture.”252
While teitairon and dōsoron appear as opposing socio-historical interpretations of Korea,
their main difference lies in regards to the Korean people’s ability to “smoothly and seamlessly”
integrate into the Japanese Empire.253 While the dōsoron scholars did not think it would be
challenging, teitairon scholars argued that Koreans could only be elevated to the level of
Japanese civilization with the proper guidance, though some were pessimistic about the time
required for Koreans to do so.254 With Korea’s full annexation by the Japanese Empire in 1910,
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Japanese programs aimed at assimilating Koreans were enacted, though there had been no
discursive consensus on the most efficient and effective methods of assimilation.255 In fact,
earlier discourses relating the Koreans and burakumin contradict the dōsoron view, for if the
burakumin were descendants of Koreans, then their inability to integrate fully into Japanese
society, despite their history in Japan and proximity to its cultural influence, would mean
Koreans would fail to integrate as well.256 Though there were many discrepancies in the various
schools of thought, each implicated the Koreans as foreign or alien to the proper Japanese way of
life.
The build-up to the full annexation of Korea was marked by not only resistance
movements in Korea, but by increasing anti-Korean sentiments in Japan. The assassination of the
statesman Itō Hirobumi by the Korean nationalist An Chunggŭn in particular sparked a wave of
attacks against Korean migrants in Japan and increased Japanese public distrust of Koreans.257
The characterizations of Koreans as conniving, self-serving, and treacherous were perpetuated by
Japanese media further fueling negative stereotypes of the country and people.258 In addition to
the previous traits of backward, degenerate, and criminal, Koreans were being imposed with all
sorts of negative value judgments on their bodies, not simply their attitudes or actions.259 Though
there was push toward shifting public perception of Koreans to a more positive light following
the annexation of Korea, the new characterizations were simply more patronizing and
condescending in nature.260
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International concerns expressed in Japan’s policy of improving its own national standing
required that particular attention be given to the issue of minorities. The national discourse was
still concerned with assimilating or subsuming any form of deviance or difference. Eventually
the processes of socialization made minority groups internalize the discriminatory ideology they
experienced and inspired some to adhere to national directives.261 However, other groups sought
to rectify the gross injustices they were subjected to and demanded that the government adhere to
its own ideology of equal status among subjects.262 Though these demands often met with little
success, the hisabetsu burakumin were eventually able to assert themselves in certain regards.263
However, the continued reliance on the officially-sanctioned narratives derived from Japanese
discourse, which deemed Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin as inherently un-Japanese, rendered
the groups helpless against an unsympathetic public and government.264 Furthermore, without a
solid sense of self-identity, both Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin were vulnerable to complying
with social stereotypes and characterizations of their persons.265 Contradictory characterizations
of minority groups did not raise questions about inconsistency or ideological failures and no
matter how much minorities tried to assimilate into Japanese society, minorities were seen as
constantly affirming their own difference.266
Given the continued resistance of Japanese colonization, Koreans were subjected to acts
of violence both in Korea and in Japan. Following the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, antiKorean sentiments sparked a series of attacks against Korean laborers and migrants, resulting in
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the persecution and deaths of more than 2000 Koreans.267 However, Koreans would remain
subject to the mechanisms of Japanese social ideology and discrimination from 1910 until 1945,
though there were many groups and movements resisting its hegemony. It is quite telling that the
ideological shifts of Japanese discourse which promoted equality between the Koreans and the
Japanese or among Japanese subjects often failed to reflect social reality.268 Korea has a long
history of being conceived of as the opposite of Japan, as a source of “Otherness,” and as a
subversive subordinate. Though there were discourses concerning the genuine integration of
Koreans into Japanese society, these outlooks not only assumed the superiority of Japanese
culture, but also ostracized Koreans in the very process of assimilating them.
The Remnants of Colonialism: Zainchi Koreans in Contemporary Japan
The discriminatory ideology developed during the Meiji era continued to fuel Japanese
perceptions of Korea and other foreign groups until the end of World War II and beyond.
Though there are changes to how Koreans are perceived given the rise of the two Korean
nations, modern Korea-Japan relations are marred by the historical oppression of the former by
the latter. While modern forms of discrimination have their roots in the ideologies of pre-war and
wartime Japan, modern Korean-Japanese relations involve land disputes, Japanese government
officials visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which memorizes the war dead including war criminals, the
“comfort women” or sexual slavery of Korean and other women by the Japanese military during
World War II, and the subversive activity of North Korea. While the ascension of North Korea
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and South Korea requires us to distinguish new nuances to Korea-Japan relations, our focus is on
the Zainichi Koreans living in Japan.
The Korean movements for social equality had their roots in the nationalistically-oriented
Korean student movements of the Meiji era, who were reacting to discrimination in Japan and its
colonial practices in Korea.269 While this particularly vocal group of Koreans are often seen as
representative of the entire Korean community in Japan, Bayliss cautions that there were great
differences among various Korean organizations in terms of their politics and aims.270
Furthermore, there is more variance than the term “Korean movement” or “Korean community”
allow, for the Korean population in Japan is not a monolithic entity.271 While minority groups’
political activities were heavily suppressed during the war, Koreans, and other groups, were able
to re-mobilize following the end of the war. The two prominent Zainichi Korean organizations in
Japan are the South Korean-backed Mindan and the North Korean-backed Chōsen Sōren, which
have carried out their own respective campaigns and programs for improving the welfare of the
Japanese Zainichi communities.272
And what is the relation between contemporary Zainichi Korean communities and
Japanese hegemony? While a deeper analysis of the group itself might reveal numerous
intricacies and narrative variances, a cursory analysis of contemporary anti-Korean
discrimination reveals that their access to equal employment, education, and marriage, among
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other things, is still challenged by prevailing cultural norms of “otherness.”273 The very term
itself “Zainichi” denotes a dimension of temporality that does not reflect the established
historical connection of the Korean group in Japan. Though they have permanent residency
status, Zainichi Koreans are regarded as visiting foreigners. The former colonial subjects, who
had gained some political rights, lost them following the end of World War II, for they were no
longer considered Japanese citizens.274 For those living in Japan, the Nationality Act of 1950,
later revised in 1952 and 1984, continued to insist on the principle of ius sanguinis, or bloodline,
as the basis of citizenship.275 Furthermore, subtle cultural coercion to adopt a “Japanesesounding name” as part of the naturalization process continues to perpetuate a sense of Japanese
cultural hegemony.276 Yet, Zainichi Koreans are prompted by both the Mindan and Chōsen
Sōren organizations to retain their distinct Korean identities.277 However, the loss of certain
assimilationist elements in the naturalization process have facilitated more people to adopt
Japanese citizenship.278
Morris-Suzuki advocates an understanding of identity that is not fixed, for younger
generations of Zainichi Koreans can speak Japanese, they have no “racially” identifiable
differences, and participate in the same cultural rituals as their Japanese peers.279 The symbolic
identification with their Korean ethnicity comes in the form of retaining their “Korean” names,
though this becomes not solely a matter of self-identification since it is also reinforced by social
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ideology.280 The issue concerning identity is not one about minorities becoming the same as the
majority nor allowing the minority to retain their difference, but questioning how boundaries are
“maintained, shifted, and reinterpreted in the process of struggles over the nature of the state.”281
Grounding one’s identity in an essentialist conceptualization of ethnic minority is, according to
the writer Chong Yong Hye, a means of validating the “existing stereotypes about the
homogeneity and purity of the majority.”282 To identify oneself as “purely Korean” is to allow
others to identify as “purely Japanese,” therefore, Chong proposes that one identifies oneself as
“impurely ‘Japanese’” or fujun Nihonjin “不純日本人” and thereby implicate oneself as
“impurely ‘Korean.’”283
In accordance with Morris-Suzuki’s concern about boundaries, Chong proposes that each
individual learn to coexist not only with difference external to oneself, but also within oneself.284
In the case of marginalized people who are made peripheral by ideology and social structures,
appropriating one’s peripheral status is the first act of actualizing difference and challenging
pervading social norms, ideology, and cultural hegemony.285 The majority of the discourse
analyzed has been concerned with the way in which dominate social discourses define not only
the mainstream populace’s identity but also how they define, subsume, or make invisible those
peripheral to it. The early Meiji Korean student movements mobilized while depending on the
narratives, justifying the subjugation of Korea and its treatment of the Korean people, offered by
the state. Later social movements, however, engaged in the processes of community and identity
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creation.286 To disrupt, challenge, and deconstruct cultural hegemony requires the existence of
difference which is expressed through the creation of counter-cultural identity.
While contemporary Zainichi Korean identity is shaped by the continued pervasiveness
of Japanese cultural hegemony and political disputes, understanding the mechanisms of
“othering” and oppression that occur within Japan presents an opportunity for Zainichi Koreans
to redefine their own identity. As Chong and Morris-Suzuki suggest, what is imperative is not
“tolerance,” but challenging the construction of “culture” (identity) as homogenous and
harmonious.287 It is not simply the recognition of the difference external to the self, but the
reassertion of the difference subsumed within the category of “Japanese.”288 To engage in the
discourse of Nihonjinron, culture, race, and so forth is to be “haunted by the ghosts of dead
theories,” which must be confronted in order to gradually redefine the parameters and
foundations a nation stakes its claim of identity on.289 And using the framework offered by both
Bayliss and Morris-Suzuki, and others, for analyzing Zainichi Korean identity, I will proceed to
analyze hisabetsu burakumin identity.
Japan’s Invisible Social Minority: Hisabetsu Burakumin and the Struggle for Liberation
Hisabetsu burakumin “被差別部落民” translates to “discriminated against hamlet
people” and refers to the group’s historical spatial locality as well as their status as victims of
discrimination. This is a name that various communities and organizations chose for themselves
after having been imposed with names such as tokushu buraku “特殊部落” or “special hamlets,”
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eta “穢多” or “an abundance of filth,” and other names designating their social status.290 Their
re-appropriation of the term “burakumin” into hisabetsu burakumin carries a political
connotation and marks it as an important aspect of their struggle against being ignored and
discriminated against. However, the term “hisabetsu” is an unspecified form of discrimination
that this paper will attempt to clarify.
It is prudent to note that there are different forms of social differentiation that societies
facilitate. The most poignant examples of social differentiation are race, gender, and class. From
these categories, I think racial differentiation parallels well with how hisabetsu burakumin are
treated, represented, and identified. There are a variety of intricate factors that further complicate
the classification of hisabetsu burakumin since differentiation of people into categories is a
process of social construction. Since there is no “ethnic” difference between hisabetsu
burakumin and “normal” Japanese people, hisabetsu burakumin are not considered a “true”
ethnic minority.
However, the scholar Timothy Amos, in his work, Embodying Difference: The Making of
Burakumin in Modern Japan, uses the term “social minority” as a way of contextualizing the
type of category hisabetsu burakumin is.291 As stated before, all types of social differentiation are
social constructs, and a “social” minority is a product of societal ideology reinforced by an
actualized reality. That is to say there were no pre-existing conditions that hisabetsu burakumin
were discriminated against, but that the conditions for discrimination were created resulting in
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the categorization of hisabetsu burakumin.292 And examining how societies carry out this process
is vital for understanding how societies utilize constructed groups, or “Others,” to carry out
specific functions, such as identity creation.
When discussing hisabetsu burakumin status within a Japanese context, I will use the
terms pariah, outcaste, and Other as a means of illustrating their social position. Each of these
terms highlights a state of being that is outside the norm while at the same time indicating the
reliance of this categorization on the society that constructs it. The interchangeability of these
terms is useful for conveying the meaning of social alienation as well as showing how Japanese
society contextualizes hisabetsu burakumin differently throughout time.
With a definition of discrimination and understanding of ideology in mind, French
philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” is also relevant to the issue of hisabetsu
burakumin discrimination. Flavia Cangia, adopting the concept in her work From Heterotopias
to Cultural Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into ‘Japanese National
Spaces,’ discusses the role hisabetsu burakumin communities have as centers of “ambivalent
meanings.”293 To elaborate, Cangia notes the common theme of associating hisabetsu burakumin
communities with dirtiness, isolation, disorder, and smelliness in discourses about them.294
Additionally, Cangia, borrowing the author Kevin Hetherington’s definition, describes
heterotopias as:
…sites in that all things displaced, marginal, rejected or ambivalent are engaged, and this
engagement becomes the bases of an alternative mode of ordering.295

292

Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 5-14.
Flavia Cangia, “From Heterotopias to Cultural Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into
‘Japanese National Spaces’,” (Urbanities, May, 2013), 43-46.
294
Flavia Cangia, “From Heterotopias to Cultural Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into
‘Japanese National Spaces’,” 43-46.
295
Ibid., 43-46.
293

Lopez-Duran 65

This complex description carries a variety of meanings, but to help clarify some of the density of
the definition, one should note how hisabetsu burakumin and their communities are perceived as
essentially taboo. To a “homogenous” society, a heterotopia would function, undesirably, as a
center of cultural and social difference. Simply by being, a hisabetsu burakumin community is
outside the norm and becomes something that resists the homogenous ideology of the
mainstream society. This existence of resistance forces mainstream society to engage with this
“Otherness” and through this engagement, social structures and ideology are challenged and
forced to change.
Furthermore, another important concept to consider when discussing the issues of
discrimination against the hisabetsu burakumin is “untouchability.” This term refers to a societal
category that designates one group of people as being fundamentally inferior or
“untouchable.”296 The imposition of values and meanings on people is something that occurs in
all human societies and is another effect of societal ideology.297 As discussed earlier, societies
create means of differentiation, and the type of differentiation imposed on hisabetsu burakumin
parallels with that of groups such as the Dalit of India, the Paekchong of Korea, and several
others.298 These groups are outcastes and are deemed to fall outside the classical social classes of
their respective societies. They are associated with filth, impurity, and foreignness, despite their
similarities, however, each group has its own unique history, challenges, and methods of
resistance.299 Understanding untouchability is key to analyzing how social minorities are
constructed and oppressed, and the case of the hisabetsu burakumin will highlight how
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complicated the consequences of constructed categorizations like untouchables and social
minorities are.
Another key concept that will be elaborated in-depth in this paper is French philosopher
Jean-François Lyotard’s “grand narrative.” Amos’s Embodying Difference presents a
comprehensive sample and analysis of it, which he termed “master narrative,” building on
Lyotard’s concept which will serve as my main reference.300 A “grand narrative” is a
representation and cultural justification describing how or why something is the way that it is.301
Though this definition is an oversimplification of an incredibly complex term, I think it provides
a cornerstone from which we can understand how grand narratives are employed by societies to
explain matters of behavior, law, tradition, social structure, and so forth. An explanation,
perspective, or world view is ingrained into the justification of whatever is being narrated and
with it a specific ideology is being perpetuated.302 Thus, when we look at these narratives as
means of explaining contemporary phenomena, we are engaging a specific ideological
representation of a subject matter.
Having elaborated on this theoretical network, the issues of the buraku mondai (“hamlet
problem” as it is often referred to) will be explored through a process of exploration and question
raising.303 How is hisabetsu burakumin identity formed and what does it mean to be hisabetsu
burakumin? What are the problems and benefits of using grand narratives to explain the buraku
mondai? What roles do or should hisabetsu burakumin communities serve in the fight against

300

Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 2-5.
301
Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 2-5.
302
Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 14-22.
303
Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 2.

Lopez-Duran 67

discrimination? How prevalent are the issues of hisabetsu burakumin discrimination? And what
contemporary issues do hisabetsu burakumin liberation movements engage in? I do not expect to
reach conclusions on each one of these points of inquiry, but raising these questions focuses the
paper on various aspects of this comprehensive issue.
The Hisabetsu Burakumin Grand Narrative and its Critique
Hisabetsu burakumin are described as a people whose group identity and discrimination
have a historical point of origin and continuity.304 Additionally, hisabetsu burakumin live in or
come from areas of villages, towns, or cities that have been part of a buraku “部落” or hamlet.
Though the urbanization of Japan and various historical events, such as war and natural
catastrophes, have caused populations to move and shift around, hisabetsu burakumin are
represented as having always kept their communities intact through such disasters.305 To better
understand this simplified description of who the hisabetsu burakumin are, a variation of Amos’s
“master narrative” will be explored in detail.
As Amos puts it in Embodying Difference, the historical narrative used for explaining the
nature and reasons for the discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin is a product of mainstream
societal interpretation.306 This “master narrative,” as he puts it, was and is used by hisabetsu
burakumin communities and organizations, the different levels and regimes of Japanese
government, and mainstream society as a means for explaining contemporary and historical
issues pertaining to the group.307 The narrative presents the issue of hisabetsu burakumin
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discrimination as having arisen from both societal ideology and structuring from either prefeudal or feudal Japan.308 As a narrative of a people and struggle, the hisabetsu burakumin grand
narrative focuses on the idea that the hisabetsu burakumin have always been a group constituted
of Japan’s social outcastes.309 It is a category with a historical point of origin and whose issues
can be understood via an exploration of the group’s collective history.
Even though this narrative provides a useful mythology for explaining the origins of the
pariah group and for illustrating the social ideology behind the discrimination, Amos argues that
it fails to account for various modern and historical discrepancies.310 The hisabetsu burakumin
grand narrative purposefully portrays a carefully constructed representation of the struggle of the
hisabetsu burakumin against societal and institutional discrimination. It relies on the binaries of
institutional and individual, historical and political, and mainstream and pariah to convey a
notion of the issue as being rather clear and simple. This narrative is meant to explain the current
reasons for discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin as well as to justify the existence and
actions of hisabetsu burakumin liberation organizations and movements. Yet, a representation
with a political agenda that is used by both oppressor and oppressed will no doubt have its
inconsistencies and fail to properly account for the actuality of contemporary buraku and
hisabetsu burakumin issues.
Any representation of a group, and a master narrative is but one format of representation,
cannot substitute the reality of their situation. As Edward Said put it in his famous work
Orientalism, it is important to scrutinize our presentation of reality as a subjective understanding
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instead of taking it to be an objective truth.311 Parsing the passage presented earlier in the paper
reveals that Said is challenging the usage of representations as a means for substituting the
reality of a situation. In the context of the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative, the narrative
serves as an appeal to history that attempts to define contemporary issues of discrimination and
identity with a historical interpretation crafted by mainstream society. Given that history itself is
a human construct, our reliance on the history sanctioned by the society that perpetuates
hisabetsu burakumin oppression requires careful scrutiny. Even if the oppressed also rely on the
grand narrative to explain the existential question of their origin, it remains a fallible
interpretation of events.
Yet, what exactly is the master narrative and how is it reflective of mainstream societal
ideology? What are the particular faults with relying on it? And are Amos’s critiques of it valid
and relevant to our understanding of contemporary hisabetsu burakumin discrimination and
identity? Without a grand narrative, how are hisabetsu burakumin supposed to understand the
actuality of their situation as victims of social and institutional discrimination?
Though there is no exact point of historical origin, pre-feudal and feudal outcaste groups
such as the hinin “非人” or “non-human” and eta are seen as the predecessors of the hisabetsu
burakumin.312 The low status of these groups was due to societal ideology imposing a lower
value on their traditional occupations.313 Their lack of ties to the land, as historically most
Japanese peasants were farmers, made them targets of discrimination.314 However, even though
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both groups were considered outcastes, the eta occupied a more rigid and despised social space
than hinin, who had some social mobility.315
The eta were particularly known for working with dead animals, corpses, and leather,
which were seen as especially impure trades.316 Cultural nativist beliefs, such as Shintō and
Buddhism, also had a role in codifying not only the trades of the eta but the eta themselves for
what they did.317 Shintō emphasized the importance of purity and there was nothing more
defiling than death.318 Likewise, Buddhist principles against the consumption of meat and its
belief in the inheritance of sins from a previous life also condemned the eta.319 Though it is often
believed that religious beliefs were one of the main factors that initiated the discrimination
against eta, it is more likely that a social ideology preceded these beliefs. As stated earlier,
Japanese culture valued farm work as the most important trade for peasants to engage in and
other occupations were looked down upon.320
Discrimination against the eta did not remain solely a social phenomenon, however, for
discrimination was further institutionalized via sumptuary laws enacted by the Tokugawa
government, after the Sengoku Period (“Warring States Period” 1467-1603).321 These laws
combined with the social stigma against the eta and hinin communities, codifying and ritualizing
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discrimination even more strongly into the culture. Traditions, social interactions, values, and
occupations were fixed by the solidification of social classes.322
A mixture of ostracizing certain groups of people because of their trades and relegating
disempowered people to functions deemed tainted perpetuated this system of social distinction.
However, the stratification among the people was not limited to employment and social status
but also occupied a material and metaphysical space. Outcastes were kept on the outskirts of
villages, towns, and cities, living in communities that were adjacent to these traditional social
centers.323 These hamlets or buraku as they came to be called were ascribed the same values that
the people living in them were attributed. Thus, the eta villagers came to be designated as
“burakumin,” though it was a category that extended beyond just the eta and included anyone
living in or near such locales.324
To understand this particular relation between space and being, the ontological
consequences of being hisabetsu burakumin as portrayed by the grand narrative will be explored.
For, whether hisabetsu burakumin came about because of their historical trades or not, they are a
group constituted of social outcastes, who were and are still discriminated against. This tradition
of discrimination has its roots in a social and institutional discourse and ideology of separation
based on societal function. Religious and cultural beliefs created a system of meaning for how
first eta, among others, and then hisabetsu burakumin were perceived. Buddhist and Shintō
beliefs, as cultural practices and as institutional doctrines, reinforced the notion that the work
carried out by hisabetsu burakumin, and their predecessors, no matter how necessary, was
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fundamentally impure and defiled.325 This ideology pervaded throughout the whole of Japanese
society, such that social and religious institutions came to ascribe those characteristics, of
impurity and defilement, not only to the trades of hisabetsu burakumin, but also to the hisabetsu
burakumin themselves.
Discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin became normalized as a result of social and
religious institutions reinforcing each other’s impositions on burakumin and other outcaste
groups like them. Yet, below all the physical and tangible expressions of discrimination, the
ideological process of creating and marginalizing the “Other” was well underway. This is
reflected in the way values placed on trades deemed defiled or subversive were ascribed to the
hisabetsu burakumin and hinin themselves, marking specifically the former as being
fundamentally impure and, by extension, un-Japanese.326
Reinforcement of social discrimination in the form of the social castes created by the
Tokugawa government added a political element to the discrimination. The creation of the four
main social divisions, as modeled on the Confucian structure of the Zhou dynasty of Ancient
China, saw to the creation of the unique eta/hisabetsu burakumin caste, which lay outside the
four main divisions.327 Hisabetsu burakumin were bound to their caste and were avoided by
mainstream society and any interaction with other classes required specific rituals to be
performed to avoid non-burakumin classes/individuals/spaces from becoming tainted. Though
social mobility, while limited, occurred during this period in Japanese history, it was even more
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restricted for hisabetsu burakumin.328 Since, they were ascribed a sense of impurity no matter
how wealthy, prominent, or useful they were, it was highly challenging to move up the social
hierarchy, let alone escape pervasive social values.329 The position and values ascribed to
hisabestu burakumin bodies became an imposed reality that marked the identity and experiences
of the hisabestu burakumin and their descendants.
Despite the discrimination that they experienced and the social and legal regulations that
required them to show subservience to any member of the other four social divisions, hisabestu
burakumin lived in an odd economic situation. The ideological perspective imposed upon their
traditional trades inadvertently granted hisabestu burakumin monopolies and this in turn allowed
some hisabestu burakumin to become economically successful.330 And if they could hide their
background well, some hisabestu burakumin even escaped their station in life and ascended to a
higher social class.331 It is important to note that these two advantages and practices are not
meant to downplay the discrimination suffered by hisabetsu burakumin nor to claim that this was
a common, accessible reality for all, but instead are meant to highlight the complexity of their
situation. Given that they were not ethnically or phenotypically different, hisabetsu burakumin
are not “visibly” discernable from non-burakumin Japanese. Thus, the Tokugawa government
attempted to establish “visible” markers through the sumptuary laws, but it was possible to work
around the regulations with sufficient economic power.332
Yet, despite the potential prosperity afforded to some by their status, hisabestu
burakumin remained a low-status position. It was completely acceptable, for example, for
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samurai to cut down hisabestu burakumin with impunity and without real cause.333 It was
impermissible for hisabestu burakumin to physically touch non-burakumin, lest they pollute
them, and if contact was made, the non-burakumin would have to perform a ritual purification.334
Additionally, even if it was possible to hide one’s background, if one were ever outed or
discovered, the consequences would be very severe. Likewise, the immense psychological and
emotional stress caused by hiding one’s identity and fearing ever being discovered would
discourage most hisabetsu burakumin from doing so. The power of discriminatory ideology,
when enacted via mechanisms of the state and through social ritual, is perpetuated completely
when the discriminated begin to police themselves according to the rules of their oppressors.
However, with the fall of the Tokugawa government during the latter half of the
nineteenth century, the Meiji imperial government, influenced by global events, put effort into
restructuring the whole of Japanese government and society in an attempt to modernize and
Westernize it.335 The government was prompted to “modernize” by Japan’s vulnerability to
potential Western intervention and military power.336 Along with the various reformation
projects, Western discourses were also explored further and influenced the creation of Meiji
Japan.337 Philosophies and sociological theories about race, society, and nation allowed Japanese
scholars and government officials to reanalyze and reinterpret the buraku mondai.338 In order to
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compete successfully with Western powers, the Meiji government engaged the issue of hisabetsu
burakumin discrimination in order to unite its citizenry and move past the archaic feudal
structures of the Tokugawa Shogunate.339
In the year 1869, the Japanese feudal caste system officially ended, indicating the
beginning of the Meiji government’s new social policy.340 In 1871, the new government passed
the Senmin Haishirei, which sought to give outcastes equal living status.341 In reality, this edict,
more commonly known as the Kaihōrei, actually proved more harmful to hisabetsu burakumin
communities than beneficial.342 The lifting of past institutional and social restrictions meant that
the monopolies over the traditional occupations hisabetsu burakumin were engaged in, were no
longer in place and this led to a decline in living standards.343 Coupled with this new economic
reality, hisabetsu burakumin continued to experience discrimination as social norms of
difference and ostracism persisted throughout society.344 Thus, even if the law granted hisabetsu
burakumin equal status, the social, economic, and institutional reality of the situation remained
the same, as did the value impositions on hisabetsu burakumin bodies. These new reforms, fused
with lack of substantial social change, created the conditions for hisabetsu burakumin
communities to worsen, instead of improve, and buraku communities remained or regressed into
slums.345
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During this time period, however, hisabetsu burakumin began to mobilize into
movements and organizations that advocated for their rights, fought against discrimination, and
challenged the government to address the issues their communities were facing.346 Economic
destitution, poor services in hisabetsu burakumin communities, international interests, and
pressure from activist organizations pressured the Meiji government to act, but few substantial
actions were taken.347 With the changes to social structuring, industrialization, and political
dynamics, hisabetsu burakumin communities were absorbed into the larger growing population
centers of Japan. Even though their hamlets had historically been adjacent to town, city, and
village centers, hisabetsu burakumin communities became harder to geographically isolate. This
process of population integration began during the Meiji restoration and continued after the
American occupation. Yet, even though hisabetsu burakumin communities became slightly less
distinguishable, societal differentiation persisted as a result of social ideology, cultural
codification of discrimination, and policies like the family registry.
Family registration is the documentation of one’s genetic and ancestral history and was
used by the government for the documentation of the populace as a whole for various other
administrative functions.348 The Meiji government initiated a comprehensive documentation of
hisabetsu burakumin community numbers, functions, and populations in order to evaluate
economic potential and labor resources.349 Using family registry, one’s ancestral homeland and
genealogy were cemented, and since the information was a matter of public record, individuals
and companies could use registries to determine whether or not someone was from a buraku or
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was hisabetsu burakumin.350 Despite the various changes occurring during the Meiji period, the
societal ideology that constructed hisabetsu burakumin as being essentially different from
“normal” Japanese citizens morphed discursively. These new, subtler forms of discrimination
manifested as a response to the edicts ending the Tokugawa laws’ “visible” differentiation.351
In response to the various socio-economic changes and continued discrimination,
hisabetus burakumin communities began to organize themselves into movements and
organizations that sought to improve their social lot.352 The most vocal and powerful
organization of the time, 1922-1942, was the Zenkoku Suiheisha “全国水平社” or “Levelers’
Association of Japan.”353 Known for its denunciatory tactics and its strong anti-discrimination
stance, the Suiheisha proved to be a powerful political and social entity for hisabetsu burakumin
communities to assert their socio-political relevance.354 Using various communities and wealthy
individuals’ collective power and resources, the Suiheisha continued to pressure the government
into initiating more comprehensive projects aimed at destroying various areas of inequality.355
The poor hygienic conditions of hisabetsu burakumin communities and access to economic and
educational resources were the main areas of concern for the Suiheisha, in addition to their push
for anti-discriminatory legislation.356
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Though the Suiheisha experienced its share of setbacks, an interesting period of time for
the organization came with the increased militarization of Japan. Given the rise of nationalism
and militarism, the Suiheisha found itself in an odd position of fighting against ideology that
sought to categorize its members as being non-Japanese, and therefore susceptible to
discrimination, or appealing to anti-foreigner sentiments in order to solidify themselves as being
members of Japanese society. While it is certain that members of the organization were divided
as to what position they should take as a whole, hisabetsu burakumin continued to push for
social progress. Though as a result of the national militarism, government control became more
explicit and rigid, eventually leading to the Suiheisha ceasing its operations around the 1940s.
Following the end of World War II and during the American occupation, hisabetsu
burakumin communities once more reorganized themselves to continue fighting against
inequality. From the remnants of the Suiheisha, former members established the Burakumin
Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei and henceforth BLL), an organization that closely
followed the activities and stances of the old Suiheisha.357 However, due to conflicting politics
and interests, some members were kicked out of the BLL or left of their own accord; these
individuals formed a new organization known as the Buraku Liberation Alliance (Zenkoku
Buraku Kaihō Undō Rengōkai, or Zenkairen).358 Though both of these organizations set out to
fight for the rights of hisabetsu burakumin communities and to eliminate social prejudice, they
disagreed on the means to those ends. The BLL focused on accusatory tactics, denouncing
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discriminators and were more militant in nature.359 Zenkairen, on the other hand, adopted less
aggressive tactics and focused on assimilationist approaches.360
As the BLL and Zenkairen pushed for the advancement and rights of hisabetsu
burakumin communities and individuals, the Japanese federal government also enacted a series
of beneficial policies aimed at eliminating the levels of inequality found in hisabetsu burakumin
communities.361 Beginning in 1969, the Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects diverted
funding to impoverished communities in an effort to reduce illiteracy rates, increase access to
new public goods and services, as well as increase the welfare of the communities as a whole.362
These projects continued to be funded until 2002, when the Japanese federal government
declared that it had accomplished the goals it had laid out in the Special Measures Law.363
Though hisabetsu burakumin organizations, especially the BLL, requested that the Special
Measures Law be reauthorized, their request was denied.364 Even though no more additional
funding was being provided for continuing the programs initiated in hisabetsu burakumin
communities, the BLL and other organizations recognized the positive impact that the Special
Measures Law had in reducing community concerns about education, employment, public
services, and so forth.365
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As a result of these projects, Zenkairen dissolved on March 3, 2004, after declaring that
“the buraku issue has basically been resolved.”366 Although, the organization’s members later
formed the National Confederation of Human Rights Movements in The Community (Zenkoku
Chiiki Jinken Undō Sōrengō or Zenkoku Jinken Ren) to continue fighting against all forms of
discrimination.367 The Burakumin Liberation League adopted a similar stance and continues to
fight against discrimination and human rights injustices, though it does not see the buraku
mondai as having been resolved.368 The BLL continues to stress the importance of passing
federal anti-discriminatory legislation.
A Fallacious Narrative and Hisabetsu Burakumin Identity Politics
So, if the issue of discrimination is not over for hisabetsu burakumin, and I agree with the
BLL that it is not, then there has to be something problematic with how the grand narrative
appears to conclude with the government’s projects ending the buraku mondai. In fact, the
representation of the buraku mondai via the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative fails to account
for various intricate aspects of hisabetsu burakumin identity, resistance, societal reaction, and so
forth. For example, why is the notion of historical continuity so assured, despite the wars and
natural catastrophes that would have resulted in population shifts and movements? Also, how
complex was the economic reality for hisabetsu burakumin during the period of time when they
held monopolies over very important and necessary trades? Did the edicts of the Meiji
government have any beneficial impact on hisabetsu burakumin communities? Furthermore,
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what does it mean to be hisabetsu burakumin according to the grand narrative? What can be
gained from understanding the buraku mondai?
To answer the question of population movements and shifts, Amos claims that hisabetsu
burakumin communities and members were a lot more fluid and would often move from location
to location.369 This does not mean that hisabetsu burakumin were more nomadic or traditionally
migratory, but that as a result of living conditions, discrimination, wars, and other external
factors, whole communities were often forced or coaxed into moving.370 Given that hinin and eta
were both treated as outcastes and that any people living in or near an eta village were classified
as being eta themselves, then it is not unreasonable to believe that the same phenomena occurred
for hisabetsu burakumin communities later on. As city populations grew during the Edo period,
hisabetsu burakumin communities and other undesirables were continuously pushed to poorer
and poorer areas while their old communities were incorporated into the expanding city limits.371
As a result, Hisabetsu burakumin communities, though located near traditional geographical
landmarks like rivers or on poor land, have mainly been incorporated into the cities and towns
that continually pushed them outward.372
After World War II, American officials introduced land reforms and distributed parcels
of land to Japanese and hisabetsu burakumin alike, although the latter had historically limited
involvement with farming as they were often forced to give up any arable land.373 Given that
Japan was also decimated by continuous American bombing campaigns, portions of the Japanese
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populace moved around to avoid getting caught up in the destruction.374 Even though new slums
were created in the years that followed the war, traditional hisabetsu burakumin communities
had to be re-established and they became populated by immigrants and other non-burakumin
peoples, like the Koreans, as well.375 The traditional concept of the hisabetsu burakumin as a
monolithic group that has historical continuity is less than feasible with all these considerations
in mind.
The notion of “passing,” or submerging one’s identity with another identity to escape
unfavorable social positioning, was a viable tactic available to some hisabetsu burakumin.376
Lack of ethnic and racial makers meant that certain limitations faced by other ethnic/racial
minorities, did not prevent hisabetsu burakumin from blending into mainstream Japanese
society. The socialized rituals and sumptuary laws of the Tokugawa period were repealed with
the rise of the Meiji government and it became even more feasible to hide one’s identity of being
hisabetsu burakumin or coming from a buraku. As mentioned before, another factor that ties in
with passing and that complicates the issue of hisabetsu burakumin disenfranchisement is their
historical economic power.
With their historical trades being taboo and deemed impure, hisabetsu burakumin were
able to secure certain monopolies on leatherworking, policing, sanitation, and various other
undesirable occupations.377 Hisabetsu burakumin were able to gain a degree of political power
and were in fact important workers, due to leatherworking, during the Sengoku Period.378
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Competing daimyō (大名 “feudal warlords”) employed leatherworkers to maintain their armies
and equip them with necessary tools and armaments for warfare.379 Hisabetsu burakumin
communities noted for their leatherwork, were employed by powerful daimyo and gained status
as a vital asset to enlist for any army.380 The end of the Sengoku Period, however, did mean that
less demand was placed on hisabetsu burakumin communities for producing artifacts of war. But
the Tokugawa government imposed and facilitated various functions for hisabetsu burakumin
communities to carry out in order to maintain social order.381
During the Edo period, the leader of the major kantō hisabetsu burakumin communities
was known as the Danzaemon and he (always male due to traditional patriarchal social
organization) was directly enlisted into the service of the Shogun.382 The Danzaemon functioned
as a means for controlling and redirecting hisabetsu burakumin and other outcaste communities
into different works on behalf of the government.383 They would often be tasked with jobs such
as catching criminals, acting as police and executioners, doing sanitation and fire prevention
work, in addition to their traditional trades.384 Though these various functions gave the hisabetsu
burakumin a certain degree of political power, their association with impurity and the oppressive
aspects of the government only increased the resentment they experienced from other classes and
groups.385 Despite the discrimination they experienced, however, hisabetsu burakumin who were
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able to accumulate influence, power, and wealth through this system were capable of escaping
the bonds of being identified as hisabetsu burakumin.386
Another issue with the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative is that the Meiji edicts that
abolished class stratification were not able to resolve the issues of discrimination and
impoverishment in their communities. As mentioned before, the unexpected backlash of such
edicts was that hisabetsu burakumin communities began to decline with the loss of their
economic monopolies.387 Even though outsiders began engaging in trades that were deemed
socially taboo, the main focus of discrimination and association with those trades, and their
impurity, was still on the hisabetsu burakumin.388 This is partly because the category of “new
citizen” created by the edicts that was meant to liberate outcaste groups instead simply renamed
the old feudal dynamic of the Edo period.389 The phrase “new citizen” became a derogatory term
and members of outcaste groups found themselves only a little better off under the new
government than they had been under the Tokugawa regime. 390
Even though the political reality for pariah groups like the hisabetsu burakumin had
conceptually changed, the social structure of society remained relatively untouched even after
social classes were made more open to social mobility.391 Despite the enlightenment ideology the
early Meiji government was perpetuating, the lack of substantial policy reform and funding of
projects aimed at eliminating issues in buraku meant that hisabetsu burakumin were a vulnerable
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demographic.392 The Meiji edicts were more detrimental to the group since enlightenment
ideology and the edicts of liberation were used as counterarguments to any claims of
discrimination or disparate treatment.393 The rise of nationalism also suppressed open-critique of
the government, since doing so was considered unpatriotic and un-Japanese.394 Even the
Suiheisha had to adopt an unsavory stance supporting the nationalistic ideology of the
government and their foreign military expeditions.395 The fear of being deemed a foreign element
was even more prevalent during the latter Meiji era given the widespread appeal of Western
eugenics and racial theory in Japanese discourses by scholars, who sought to justify military
expansions and imperialism.396
The fear of peripheral groups being deemed exclusively “Other” in the fullest sense
explains why hisabetsu burakumin individuals and communities strove to establish mythologies
of origin.397 Using these mythologies, hisabetsu burakumin engaged in the process of creating
their own narratives for explaining and justifying their social and political reality.398 Given the
rising nationalism, foreignness was one of the biggest markers for discrimination and so
hisabetsu burakumin communities rejected notions of being foreign and embraced the stance that
they, unlike other groups, were at least Japanese.399 Meiji scholars were busy reanalyzing and
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reinterpreting the category of hisabetsu burakumin as a racial identity and explaining how the
hisabetsu burakumin were sub-human.400 These discourses were founded upon earlier Edo period
thinking though they were infused with new Western and Japanese ideas. The reformulation of
societal structure during the Edo and Meiji periods brought with it the need to redefine and
reorient society’s Others. Having pride in being hisabetsu burakumin was considered a direct
insult, and one worthy of intense scrutiny, to the idea of Japanese identity, as the two were
conceptualized as being diametrically opposed.401 As I have argued, the socio-political reforms
of the Edo and Meiji periods did little to change the hisabetsu burakumin’s association with
impurity and defilement, regardless of their economic reality or supposed social liberation.
As I have demonstrated, the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative fails to account for
various complications and establishes a representation of hisabetsu burakumin that is tied to a
notion of historical continuity and the discrimination they experienced. Thus, to be hisabetsu
burakumin according to the grand narrative means: 1) you must have a genealogical or ancestral
tie to the historical eta community; 2) your ancestors engaged in impure trades that affected their
social positioning; 3) your liberation was achieved as a result of the Kaihōrei (“Emancipation
Edict”) and Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects; 4) you or your family currently
reside in or have resided in a hisabetsu burakumin community. However, even while
acknowledging the actuality of their discrimination and the affects that it has had on their
communities and bodies, hisabetsu burakumin are an invented social category if their identity is
based on the grand narrative. I have analyzed a variety a reasons for why this type of identity,
multi-faceted as it might be, cannot possibly work as a foundation for hisabetsu burakumin
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identity. To reiterate, I am not arguing that the hisabetsu burakumin identity does not have
ontological consequences or that it has not affected the social reality of the people identified as
hisabetsu burakumin, but that the grand narrative’s representation renders hisabetsu burakumin
identity as unrealistic.
First, the notion that one’s ancestry or genealogical history can be determined empirically
is not possible even with the extensive documentation of the family registry dating from the
Meiji period. This is because populations shift as a result of migration, war, natural disasters, or a
host of other potential reasons. Passing further complicates this idea since there is no phenotypic
distinction to give “visible” markers of difference. Social matters, like family genealogy or
homeland, could be forged and hidden with sufficient wealth and social power, which some
hisabetsu burakumin had. And even though there had historically been a distinction between the
hinin and eta groups, the close proximity between these two pariah groups often led to common
association and conflation. Since the political and social systems neglected outcastes until the
Meiji era, there was no real, sustained effort by the government to carefully track and record who
was what in outcaste communities across Japanese history. This became even more problematic
following World War II, when hisabetsu burakumin communities became populated by
immigrants and other non-burakumin individuals, who were of the same socioeconomic
standing. Even if one were not originally from a buraku community as soon as one begins to live
there, then one is associated with being hisabetsu burakumin and is regarded as such.402
Since hisabetsu burakumin communities still engage in historical trades as well as newer
occupations of similar social standing, it seems more reasonable to assume that this aspect of
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hisabetsu burakumin identity remains consistent. However, there are non-burakumin Japanese
and foreigners who engage in the exact same lines of work and who also experience similar
levels of discrimination as the hisabetsu burakumin.403 The issue is that spatial meaning is
assigned to locations near or related to hisabetsu burakumin communities. The notion of filth and
impurity is no longer simply associated with the trade, but with the location in which the work
takes place. Aside from the actual geographical space and the assumptions that such places are
filthy and smelly, the workers in those areas occupy a virtual space, thereby imbibing in the same
imposed values.404 Discrimination against any work/trade deemed filthy or impure is not a
remnant of ancient social ideology, but is an ingrained and adapting cultural code. Religious
notions in Japan have always been a mixture of cultural beliefs, ritual behavior, and reflect,
rather than create, social ideology. It is not because of the Shintō belief concerning purity and
impurity or the Buddhist condemnation of killing life and eating meat or its concept of sin that
hisabetsu burakumin discrimination persists.
Ideology is pervasive and it is difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate in its entirety from
a society. The cultural codification of discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin means that
even if the “historical” markers, i.e. sumptuary laws, occupation, and living space, are no longer
existent or as tangible, the values imposed on their very bodies have not changed. Even the
seemingly “radical” transformation of society during the Meiji Restoration failed to eliminate the
social values marking hisabetsu burakumin individuals and communities as impure and
inherently un-Japanese. If the newer institutions and societal structures simply repurposed the
old value systems, reorienting them slightly toward new aims, then it follows that the ideology
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for differentiating members of society has remained more or less intact. New discourses do not
necessarily negate or eliminate preceding ideologies, thus a society conceptualizing itself as
enlightened might at the same time ascribe to a notion of racial hierarchy or social ordering
based on perceived social positioning.
In regards to the economic reality and the living conditions of the hisabetsu burakumin
communities after the American occupation, the elimination of material barriers did not equate to
an elimination of metaphysical barriers. Despite the benefits that hisabetsu burakumin
organizations and communities received as a result of the Special Measures Law, the issue of
discrimination did not disappear along with the material issues of illiteracy, poor education, poor
public services, and inefficient and hazardous community planning.405 Instead the elimination of
these issues masked the more important discourse of ending discrimination against hisabetsu
burakumin. If one were to conceptualize the issue of hisabetsu burakumin as being grounded in
their economic conditions, i.e. historical occupation or unequal living conditions, then it would
not be irrational to conclude that the elimination of these obstacles would result in the end of
discrimination. The grand narrative itself is oriented around this outlook, for the solution to these
issues is increasing material resources available to hisabetsu burakumin communities.406 Yet,
despite the material improvements to hisabetsu burakumin communities, and they are now
distinguishable because of their high living quality, the reality of the situation is that the buraku
mondai is far from resolved.

405

Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 157-163.
406
Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 14-22.

Lopez-Duran 90

As discussed earlier, living in a buraku community, a community designated as being
historically a hisabetsu burakumin community or populated highly by hisabetsu burakumin,
itself is a marker for being identified as hisabetsu burakumin. But since we know that population
shifts and immigration have led to non-burakumin peoples moving into hisabetsu burakumin
communities, this notion is likewise fallacious. Given the process urbanization and as a
consequence of the Special Measures Law, hisabetsu burakumin have greater mobility, allowing
them to move from locations traditionally associated with them to all parts of Japan.407 Without
the easily accessible means to “out” individuals, and because they have no visible signifiers of
difference, would it be accurate to say that individuals who have no markers of being social
minorities can still identify as hisabetsu burakumin? Without the grand narrative, the framework
entailing the contemporary, post- American occupation, collective experience of the group must
serve as the foundation for hisabetsu burakumin identity. To compound the complexity of this
identity, the grand narrative only described a generalized historical continuity for hisabetsu
burakumin communities of the Kansai and Kanto regions of Japan. Certain hisabetsu burakumin
communities located further west or northeast of these regions had different experiences and
some experienced little to no discrimination at all.408 Therefore, a new framework for
understanding contemporary hisabetsu burakumin identity must be analyzed in order to properly
outline the nuances and distinguishing features of this social minority.
However, this critique is aimed at deconstructing the identity formulated by the grand
narrative and is not a criticism that regards hisabetsu burakumin discrimination as negligible or
fictitious. I intend to open the discussion as to what constitutes hisabetsu burakumin identity as I
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can only speculate that changes in social ideology and the efforts of hisabetsu burakumin
organizations have made some changes to how society depicts and understands hisabetsu
burakumin. Currently, hisabetsu burakumin organizations like the BLL are having difficulty
attracting younger members into their ranks as social activists, despite their policy expansions
and outreach programs.409 This potentially indicates that younger generations are not as worried
about issues of discrimination as older generations, that they are ignorant of societal
discrimination, that they no longer experience significant discrimination which would prompt
them to become members, or organizations simply do not adhere to the concerns of younger
generations. This generational gap also means that hisabetsu burakumin identity is construed
differently by younger generations.
In the case of older generations, they might remember the times when they had to fight
for the improvement of their communities and the rights they enjoy today. Since younger
generations are removed from those experiences and struggles, they become less engaged with
the reality and tradition of struggle. To them, being hisabetsu burakumin no longer carries the
same connotation that it once did and it might even be seen as a burden or unneeded add-on to
their own personal identity. Given that traditional social impositions are harder to pin as
populations and landscapes change, younger generations might be able to escape the labels and
difficulties that come with being identified hisabetsu burkaumin. Even during the height of
hisabetsu burakumin activism, hisabetsu burakumin liberation movements were divided over the
ultimate end of their organizations.410 Should hisabetsu burakumin become an obsolete category
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that no longer describes people outside of a historical context or discourse? Or is being hisabetsu
burakumin something that should be embraced and asserted to resist cultural hegemony?
Hisabetsu burakumin culture is a numinous topic that various authors, such as Amos and
Cangia, alluded to but never truly define. Hisabetsu burakumin communities, such as the ones in
Osaka, link their culture to the historical works hisabetsu burakumin were known for, such as
leatherworking and specifically taiko drum making.411 However, an appeal to history is a
problematic basis for a diverse group like the hisabetsu burakumin, who carried out a wide
variety of functions and trades. The difficulty of encompassing a group of people as varied as the
hisabetsu burakumin is further complicated by the fact that even issues of common struggle
varied from location to location. Marginalized people are not monoliths. However, could the
tradition of resistance provide some foundation for hisabetsu burakumin identity? This neither
ties the identity to the historical grand narrative nor to the disparate discrimination experienced
by communities, but rather to a tradition (not rooted in history but of modern conception) of
struggle against discrimination. While this offers us only a rudimentary framework for
understanding hisabetsu burakumin identity, it shifts away from the representation created by the
historical narrative that appeals to continuity, uniformity, and resolution. The continued
resistance by hisabetsu burakumin, and their national, regional, and local associations, to
codified social rituals, discrimination, and cultural hegemony is what constitutes a feature of the
social minority’s identity.
This type of identity requires an understanding of changes to cultural context that are not
accounted for by appeals to history. And I speculate this only to be the barest of outlining
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distinctions for what it means to be hisabetsu burakumin. It is possible that re-appropriated
features of hisabetsu burakumin culture, while recognizing community variance, can also add to
a sense of identity? Though it is difficult to see specific traditions, behaviors, and ideas
constituting a major feature of a collective identity, for that is the process of national/hegemonic
identity making, things are not so bleak. If collective identity is constructed on a foundation of
internal variance, and not as monolithic, then it is quite possible that being hisabetsu burakumin
might entail more than universal traditions or characteristics. Yet, how are hisabetsu burakumin
who are not explicitly engaged in struggles against discrimination able to identify as hisabetsu
burakumin?
Since, the above framework for hisabetsu burakumin identity rests upon the tradition of
resistance, then those who are beneficiaries of resistance to discrimination, i.e. younger
generations, are also identifiable as hisabetsu burakumin. Though this seemingly identifies any
person who joins the resistance against discrimination as hisabetsu burakumin, the very fact said
person had the choice to join, a privilege normally reserved only for out-group members,
indicates that they are not hisabetsu burakumin. Likewise, regardless of one’s personal
commitment to the struggle for liberation, someone who is not a child and/or hides/rejects their
identity as hisabetsu burakumin will continue to be so, for social impositions do not always align
with personal self-identification.
However, if one identifies as hisabetsu burakumin, then it means one recognizes the
tradition of resistance that has been, and is being, engaged against societal ideology and
structures which relegate people to pariah status. Regarding oneself as hisabetsu burakumin is
neither obsolete nor equivalent to holding onto an archaic notion, rather, younger generations
should actively identify themselves with the struggle against discrimination that continues to
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affect their lives and shape their cultural context. Though one might consider the possibility of
eliminating the need to identify as hisabetsu burakumin as the means for younger generations to
think that the last vestiges of discriminatory ideology will be overcome. Despite the controversy,
the idea that the ultimate aim of social movements is to establish societies in which difference no
longer determines one’s social, political, or economic reality, though possibly naïve, is a
legitimate notion individuals and organizations mobilize for nonetheless.
Assessing current social conditions, however, demonstrates that such a postdiscrimination society is still a far-distant ideal. Hisabetsu burakumin are still discriminated
against in areas such as employment and marriage, since concerned employers or families use
illegal address books or private detective agencies to investigate the backgrounds of potential
employees or spouses/in-laws.412 Even if a hisabetsu burakumin individual lives in a non-buraku
community or does not even engage in a “traditional” occupation, the values of impurity, filth,
and foreignness are still ascribed to their very body. Though these practices were more common
during the Meiji period, and up until family registries were closed to public access, they
resurface since the demand for the information persists. A famous incident relating to this type of
discrimination involved a notorious address book known as "A Comprehensive List of Buraku
Area Names" (Tokushu Buraku Chimei Sōkan).413 An Osaka-based firm secretly compiled a
book listing all the names and locations of hisabetsu burakumin settlements and showing how to
compare them to people’s addresses so one could determine if a person is/was hisabetsu
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burakumin or a buraku resident. Though the book was eventually banned from publication, it
continues to be printed illegally and can still be found circulating in underground markets.414
Another notable instance anti-hisabetsu burakumin discrimination discussed by Amos is
an experience Uramoto Yoshifumi had, known as the “Mass Discriminatory Postcard Affair.”415
This incident involved a perpetrator who believed in the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative
and who considered hisabetsu burakumin to be a polluted and subversive element affecting
Japanese society.416 Over 400 individuals and groups, including the Tokyo Meat Market (a
company unaffiliated with hisabetsu burakumin) and Uramoto, were sent threatening and
demeaning postcards.417 Though the Tokyo police was able to find and apprehend the suspect,
who was charged with fines and a prison sentence, the hate crime shows how discriminatory
ideology still persists in Japanese society. Despite the size of such incidents, large discrimination
cases are rare and most minor cases are undocumented or are much more subtle in nature. And I
highlight these two larger cases not to argue that discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin
normally occurs on such a scale, but that discriminatory ideology rooted in traditional discourses
has not disappeared, despite popular belief and the attitudes of younger generations.
The Creation of Heterotopias and Assertion of Hisabetsu Burakumin Identity
It for the reasons explored above that hisabetsu burakumin communities and museums of
human rights, established by their organizations and other anti-discrimination social movements,
serve an important function as centers of resistance. Hisabetsu burakumin communities and these
museums are the heterotopias Cangia outlined in her work “From Heterotopias to Cultural
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Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into ‘Japanese National Spaces’.”418
Since heterotopias are sites of “Otherness” and aspects societies often overlook or ignore, they
function as the means for forcing the greater society to engage in discourses of social
difference.419 When human rights become a prominent discourse in Japan, hisabetsu burakumin
organizations took the opportunity to seize its language and international attention to bring light
to the buraku mondai and other liberation struggles.420 With the Japanese federal government
wanting to gain influence within the United Nations and thanks to the pressure brought by
international attention, resistance organizations were able to promote the enactment of a series of
programs aimed at educating mainstream Japanese citizens about issues of discrimination.421
However, the government had its own programs that often conflicted with the messages
conveyed by hisabetsu burakumin organizations, for the government was trying to portray the
solution to human rights violations and discrimination as solely depending on people adopting
attitudes of understanding and tolerance.422 However, hisabetsu burakumin organizations and
other resistance movements argued that a degree of government intervention, in the form of
legislation and social structuring, was required to resolve the discrimination issues and
injustices.423
One of the most famous centers of resistance and human rights education is Liberty
Osaka, which has heavy ties with the Osaka Burakumin Liberation League chapter and is located
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in a hisabetsu burakumin community.424 The museum displays a series of different exhibitions
visitors can engage detailing various social struggles and injustices that have occurred
throughout Japanese history, including women’s rights, the “comfort women” issue,
discrimination against victims of the atomic bombings, a hisabetsu burakumin exhibit, and much
more.425 Locations like this continue to challenge societal norms and narratives concerning
discrimination and injustices while assisting activist movements in educating fellow citizens
about contemporary social issues.
The struggle for ending discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin is far from over,
even if it appears as if though the discrimination against them gradually diminishes over time, it
will only come about because of the efforts made by people to destroy and resist discriminatory
social practices and ideas. Social change does not occur without reason and the reason for the
continued fight against a seemingly “resolved” problem is that it was never truly solved. I do not
think that social issues for untouchables can simply be fixed with the dissipation of the
discrimination against them nor through their integration into the society that marginalizes them.
Only through the creation of an independent collective identity and system of values and
society’s recognition of a group’s struggle can the process for moral repair begin. I will offer no
concrete conclusion or framework for moral repair, a complex concept that I have only begun to
explore. Though I do speculate that continued efforts by marginalized peoples and heterotopias
will continue to make strides toward challenging social ideologies and cultural hegemony.
However, it rests upon a newly motivated generation to take up the tradition of resistance for
change to become a reality.
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While untouchability appears like a domestic issue, the struggles for human rights and
social liberation affect people everywhere around the world. I am aware of my appeal to a
universal humanistic perspective here, however, I find it a moral imperative to be invested in the
liberation of oppressed and marginalized peoples around the world. How exactly can
international scholars and activists become engaged in the movement? What are the ethics that
scholars should abide by when analyzing and establishing representations of groups? And how
can our understanding of untouchability as a societal process of “Othering” assist in fighting
against cultural hegemony in Japan and elsewhere? While these are questions to consider further
for the study of marginalized communities in Japan and elsewhere, I will not explore them indepth in this paper though I find them worth intense consideration.
Without an essentialist characteristic, common experience of discrimination, genealogical
bond, unifying political ideology, or historical continuity, how is the modern hisabetsu
burakumin community supposed to define itself? Though the answer to this question is far from
simple and requires serious consideration in its own right, I think it is possible to suggest a
conceptualization similar to our previous analysis of Japanese and Zainichi Korean identity.
Understanding the context that facilitated the creation of a common “invented tradition” or
“imagined community” is crucial for recognizing how hisabetsu burakumin identity is formed.
While the restrictions of the grand narrative appear to give a more definite explanation of
hisabetsu burakumin identity, I think it is the duty of individuals who identify themselves as
hisabetsu burakumin to question the traditionally imposed values and parameters of identity.
Accepting the grand narrative is tantamount to perpetuating Japanese cultural hegemony and the
very mechanisms of oppression marginalized groups are subjected to. To reiterate Morris-
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Suzuki, an individual who engages the traditional discourses of identity must wrestle with the
ghosts of dead theories.426
The assertion of a newly “invented” notion of identity is not disingenuous and is
potentially less problematic. Individuals will continue to define the parameters of their identity
and associate themselves with various facets of their culture and society. The recognition of
marginalized peoples’ struggles for self-determination and liberation is necessary for
deconstructing cultural and social hegemony. To transform not only physical and geographic
spaces into sites of difference, but to embody difference as individuals is to resist internalizedcolonization and engage in the creation of a new discourse of identity politics.
Scholarship and Identity: A Future Outlook
Having explored the relation between Japan’s hegemonic concept of identity and
marginalized identity, I will briefly expand the discourse of this paper to the ethics of
scholarship. What exactly are the duties of scholars? How are we to assess the proper ethical
framework for engaging in the representation of other cultures and peoples? Through what
means, and to what extent, can we recognize and mitigate our own biases and assumptions? And
what is the role of the scholar in challenging cultural hegemony?
I think it is important for all scholars to recognize the potential biases and assumptions
we express in our research of other groups and cultures. And though I do not want to conclude
this paper with empty moralizing or the assertion of some grandiose standard of ethical
scholarship, I am concerned with making sure that the identities and cultures of others are
represented respectfully and as truthfully as possible. It is for this particular reason that I agree
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with Lie in asserting that Japan is a multiethnic nation, for conceptualizing it as such recognizes
and reifies the struggles and identities of the marginalized peoples who live in the shadow of
Japanese hegemony. The mechanisms of oppression that silence and transform groups into
peripheral minorities operate in all parts of the world. Understanding the nuances of different
cultural forms of stratification and discrimination can assist scholars and activists alike in
resisting oppressive and subversive ideologies and social structures. The research and analysis
that I have carried out these past few years have not culminated in a concise conclusion nor have
they offered me definitive answers to the questions I have raised throughout this paper or during
the course of my research. I have encountered many more intricacies and nuances that have
prompted even more questions, though I will pursue those lines of inquiry in future projects. For
now, I only hope that the struggles and identities of the hisabetsu burakumin and Zainichi
Koreans will become more prominent in public discourses in Japan and elsewhere, thereby
stepping out of the shadow of a monolithic Japanese identity.
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